

**2003-2004**  
**LOS ANGELES COUNTY**  
**CIVIL GRAND JURY**



**FINAL REPORT**



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**GANG INJUNCTION**

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## **MANAGEMENT AUDIT OF THE CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS (CGIS)**

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

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#### **INTRODUCTION**

The 2003-2004 Civil Grand Jury embarked on a management audit of the Civil Gang Injunction (CGI) initiatives within the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles. Given the breadth of this management audit, two City and two County departments will need to participate in and cooperate with this effort, including:

- City Attorney, City of Los Angeles
- Los Angeles Police Department, City of Los Angeles
- Sheriff's Department, County of Los Angeles
- District Attorney, County of Los Angeles

The Grand Jury engaged a Consulting Group to assist with this effort. Under provisions of Penal Code Section 925a and 926, the Grand Jury requested the firm to:

- Examine documents and data relating to CGI
- Interview staff and personnel responsible for CGI
- Interview field staff onsite regarding CGI

#### **BACKGROUND**

Within the City of Los Angeles, Civil Gang Injunctions (CGIs) are developed and implemented in a joint effort by the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).<sup>1</sup> The Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) collaborate on CGIs in the County's unincorporated areas and for 40 contract cities. CGIs are the result of a civil litigation process governed by long-standing principles of due process and civil procedure. To obtain a CGI, prosecutors<sup>2</sup> present information to the Courts about gang activities that constitute a public nuisance. Injunctions can contain orders to refrain from a wide range of prohibited behaviors, including:

- Violating curfews

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<sup>1</sup> Some of these efforts require collaboration of the City Attorney and the County's District Attorney.

<sup>2</sup> In this Management Review, the term "prosecutors" refers to both the City Attorney's Office and the County's District Attorney's Office.

- Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office
  - Los Angeles City Attorney's Office
  - Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD)
  - Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
  - Pasadena Police Department
  - Lodestar Management Research, Inc., the third-party monitor of the Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) program, described later.
- Where possible, conduct interviews with residents and community leaders in neighborhoods subject to CGIs
  - Conduct four site visits with police officers and deputies, sergeants and lieutenants assigned to the following:
    - LAPD Northeast Division
    - LAPD Pacific Division
    - LAPD Southeast Division
    - LASD Lennox Substation
  - Compare and contrast the experiences with CGIs in the City of Los Angeles with those in unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County. During the course of the study, an additional point of comparison with the City of Pasadena was added.
  - Analyze data on reported serious crimes to identify, if possible, the impact of CGIs on a neighborhood
  - Develop the report (this document).

## **MANAGEMENT REVIEW SECTIONS**

This management review is divided into the following sections:

- A. **Introduction and Methodology** (this section), including the review's objectives, scope, tasks completed and sections of the report
- 
- B. **Civil Gang Injunction Context**, including an overview of gang activities in Los Angeles, law enforcement responses to the issue, recent legislation, the legal basis for the initiative, the process of obtaining a CGI, the requirements for enforcement and a review of recent literature on CGIs.
  - C. **Measurable Impact on Crime Patterns**, including a statistical review of reported crime within the City of Los Angeles to identify significant trends related to the establishment and enforcement of CGIs, and a review of data currently available from law enforcement sources.
  - D. **Findings**, focusing on the effectiveness and, to the extent that it is possible to determine, the costs of preparing and enforcing CGIs. Findings were based on interviews with police, prosecutors, neighborhood residents and community leaders, as well as a review of relevant literature and the results of the data analysis task of the review.

## **DATA, TREND ANALYSIS AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENTS**

**Finding 1: No single law enforcement agency or joint agency effort has successfully measured the outcomes of efforts to reduce gang crime and violence.**

**Finding 2: Assessing the effectiveness of different strategies is hampered by the lack of data and ability to track program costs.**

**Finding 3: Data analysis shows a significant short-term reduction in Part 1 crime in the first year of CGI implementation.**

**Finding 4: CGIs are an important part of a larger strategy to reduce and confront criminal gang activities.**

**Finding 5: CGIs have a greater lasting impact when combined with other law enforcement initiatives, community and family commitment and concerted community development.**

**Finding 6: CGIs by themselves have a limited impact on gang violence and criminal behavior.**

**Finding 7: Effective CGI implementation offers a potential path to law enforcement professionals to divert youthful offenders before they get felony records.**

**Finding 8: CGIs are effective against gang activities that meet specific criteria.**

**Finding 9: CGIs are most effective when combined with other initiatives, such as CLEAR, because of the resources brought to bear in the CLEAR program.**

**Finding 10: CGIs require ongoing support if they are to be effective over time.**

## **INTER-JURISDICTIONAL COLLABORATION**

**Finding 11: CGIs require the commitment of key leaders within both law enforcement and prosecution agencies if they are to be effective.**

**Finding 12:** The City of Los Angeles places more sustained and consistent focus on CGIs than Los Angeles County, due in part to the differing ways the function is handled between the City and County.

**Finding 13:** There are jurisdictional issues associated with setting up injunctions that cross physical boundaries between LASD and LAPD.

- E. **Recommendations**, outlining changes to make CGIs more effective as an element of the larger effort to reduce criminal gang activity and violence.

#### **DATA, TREND ANALYSIS AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENTS**

**Recommendation 1:** LAPD and LASD should continue and enhance efforts to improve the quality and consistency of the definition and reporting of gang crimes.

**Recommendation 2:** Law enforcement agencies should exploit best practices in data processing to support their management and analysis of gang suppression and intervention outcomes.

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#### **INTER-JURISDICTIONAL COLLABORATION**

**Recommendation 3:** LAPD, LASD, City Attorney's Office and County District Attorney's Office should continue to expand the use of CGIs in their ongoing collaboration to suppress gang crime and intervene in gang activities.

#### **STAFF ASSIGNMENTS**

**Recommendation 4:** Deputy Probation Officers (DPOs) should be assigned to each LAPD Gang Impact Team and LASD Gang Investigation Unit.

**Recommendation 5:** The City Attorney should assign one Deputy City Attorney to each LAPD Division Gang Impact Team to support the planning, development and enforcement of CGIs.

**ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT**

**Recommendation 6:** Once criminal behavior by gangs has been suppressed and intervention strategies are in place, the City and the County should marshal available resources to provide economic and community development in gang-impacted neighborhoods.



**A MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF  
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS (CGIs)**

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## A. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

### **BACKGROUND**

Within the City of Los Angeles, Civil Gang Injunctions (CGIs) are developed and implemented in a joint effort by the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).<sup>1</sup> The Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) collaborate on CGIs in the County's unincorporated areas and for 40 contract cities. CGIs are the result of a civil litigation process governed by long-standing principles of due process and civil procedure. To obtain a CGI, prosecutors<sup>2</sup> present information to the Courts about gang activities that constitute a public nuisance. Injunctions can contain orders to refrain from a wide range of prohibited behaviors, including:

- Violating curfews
- Associating in public with other gang members
- Gathering in certain areas, including common areas of specified housing complexes
- Blocking sidewalks
- Riding together in automobiles, both in the area of the injunction and in rival gang territories
- Wearing pagers or other paraphernalia known to indicate participation in drug sales.

When CGIs are granted, law enforcement officers<sup>3</sup> have an additional tool to use to intervene in gang activity in an afflicted neighborhood. They can address CGI violations reported by residents without forcing them to step forward as witnesses or complainants.

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In the Fall 2003, the Los Angeles County 2003-2004 Civil Grand Jury selected the CGI effort in the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles for a management review. The Civil Grand Jury's initial understanding was that law enforcement officers and prosecutors regard CGIs as being effective, especially in combination with other initiatives. The Civil Grand Jury was also aware that some community leaders and researchers had expressed reservations about CGIs' effectiveness, and that the effort required obtaining a CGI was substantial. The question raised by the Civil Grand Jury was whether law enforcement and prosecutors should continue to pursue these injunctions or apply their energies to other more effective initiatives.

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<sup>1</sup> Some of these efforts require collaboration of the City Attorney and the County's District Attorney.

<sup>2</sup> In this Management Review, the term "prosecutors" refers to both the City Attorney's Office and the County's District Attorney's Office.

<sup>3</sup> In this Management Review, the term "law enforcement officers" refers to both LAPD police officers and LASD deputies. Similarly, "law enforcement" refers to both LAPD and LASD.

## **OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND TASKS**

The management review's objective was to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of CGIs in the City and County of Los Angeles. The scope encompassed the CGI efforts in the:

### **City of Los Angeles:**

- Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
- City Attorney's Office

### **County of Los Angeles:**

- Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD)
- District Attorney's Office

The management review tasks were to:

- Develop a Work Plan and conduct an entrance conference with the involved City and County departments
- Review research and other literature pertaining to CGIs
- Gather financial and performance data and other information
- Conduct approximately 20 interviews with gang-related law enforcement experts and officials from:
  - Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office
  - Los Angeles City Attorney's Office
  - Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD)
  - Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
  - Pasadena Police Department
  - Lodestar Management Research, Inc., the third-party monitor of the Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) program, described later.
- Where possible, conduct interviews with residents and community leaders in neighborhoods subject to CGIs
- Conduct four site visits with police officers and deputies, sergeants and lieutenants assigned to the following:
  - LAPD Northeast Division
  - LAPD Pacific Division
  - LAPD Southeast Division
  - LASD Lennox Substation
- Compare and contrast the experiences with CGIs in the City of Los Angeles with those in unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County. During the course of the study, an additional point of comparison with the City of Pasadena was added.
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- E. **Recommendations**, outlining changes to make CGIs more effective as an element of the larger effort to reduce criminal gang activity and violence.

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### **Definitions and Acronyms**

### **Appendix A: Literature Review – Details and References**

### **Appendix B: Supplemental Data Analysis of Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes, by CGI, and CGI Maps**

## **B. CIVIL GANG INJUNCTION (CGI) CONTEXT**

### **CRIMINAL GANGS IN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES**

Criminal gang activity is chronic throughout greater Los Angeles, particularly in the City of Los Angeles and adjacent unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County. Los Angeles County law enforcement officials estimate that there are between 1,000 and 1,300 gangs in the County, with approximately 95,000 members. They believe that gang activities result in 500 to 600 homicides per year, or about one-half of the total homicides in Los Angeles County. In the most heavily affected areas at the worst of times, a gang-related murder occurs every three days. Worse, many of those killed are bystanders. It has been estimated that gang members hit the people they aim at only about one-half of the time.

"Gang-banging" is a style of dress and manner, as well as a criminal enterprise. It started in Los Angeles in the late 1940s and early 1950s in the Latino communities of Southern California. The baggy clothes worn by gang members are inspired by the uniforms issued in the jails in the early 1950s. At a high-profile trial of gang members, the defendants were deliberately given loose clothes so they would not appear respectable at the trial. Supporters of the defendants wore loose clothes to signify their sympathy, and the style appears to have been generally adopted by gang members and others in the community.

Gang membership also has powerful attractions. Gang members make great shows of respect for each other, both within and between gangs. Although it might seem hard to accept in the context of strutting pride and hair-trigger violence that characterizes gang culture, at least some of this respect and support is genuine. This is enormously valuable in communities where young men and women see themselves as essentially invisible. Not even their deaths cause much concern – at most, perhaps a day in the newspaper and a speech on the floor of the City Council that may not even mention their names. Gangs appeal to a) the young people whose families are fractured or failed, b) teenagers who desperately need a symbol and badge of inclusion with which to enter adulthood or c) intelligent and ambitious young adults who have little education and no desire to work at minimum wage positions. Entry into a gang can provide an alternate family, membership in an exclusive club, entry to a social elite and a career, all in one.

Gangs show a broad variety of membership and behaviors. Most gangs are territorial – they seek to control specific streets, parks, apartment complexes or neighborhoods. Territorial gangs frequently seek to control the sale of illegal drugs in these neighborhoods, and the sale of such drugs is probably the most common way the gangs support themselves. Others reside in one neighborhood and "do business" in others. Some gangs limit membership primarily or exclusively to one racial or ethnic group. There are Black, Hispanic and Asian gangs. Other gangs accept members from a variety of racial and ethnic groups.

Some gangs are large, encompassing numerous sub-gangs and "sets." Others are limited to a few dozen members in a single neighborhood.

Gang members wear distinctive clothing. For example, members who identify themselves as part of the overall Crips organization – which encompasses a considerable number of gangs – wear blue, while Bloods – also a large, multi-gang organization – wear red. Gang members wear bandanas, jackets, shoes and athletic jerseys that demonstrate their loyalties. They have specific hand signs used to tell others their affiliations. They also have gang names, given to them by more senior gang members. Gang members have favorite numbers. In Northern California, they adopt the number "14", for the 14<sup>th</sup> letter of the alphabet – "N". Southern California gang members use one number lower – "13." In recent years, however, gang members have become subtler in their use of these "markings." As police have grown knowledgeable and increasingly sophisticated, gang members have learned to avoid flamboyant indicators of gang membership. As discussed later in this report, some of that reduction may be due to more determined enforcement with more effective tools.

Young people – increasingly both men and women – join gangs by committing certain crimes, having themselves decorated with specific tattoos and being "jumped in" or beaten for a specific period of time as an initiation. In return, gangs offer community, identity, pride and protection. Many gangs are multi-generational. Two and sometimes three generations of individuals will belong to the same gang, each new generation sponsored for membership by the preceding one.

Gangs have a structure of advancement. Members who "do gang work," primarily violent crimes, become "OGs" or "Original Gangsters". Such "work" includes drive-by shootings, retail drug sales, auto theft and street robbery. Street robberies are not "business" in the sense of revenue sources but are done for prestige and to show that the gang controls a certain area.

## **THE IMPACT OF GANG ACTIVITIES ON COMMUNITIES**

Where gangs dominate a neighborhood, the daily life of ordinary residents is blighted. Graffiti is everywhere. People cannot walk down certain streets without being confronted by gang members. Interviewees shared anecdotes of being confronted, intimidated, physically threatened and even charged "fines" to walk on public sidewalks. There was one report that residents had been charged to park in their own driveways. The denial of the residents' rights to quietly enjoy the use of public places, such as sidewalks, and, worse, the transgression of individuals' rights to safety and security on their own property are frightening to residents. They are seen as evidence that the larger society, represented primarily by law enforcement officers, has lost control of the community. The thought that a street gang has replaced the forces of law and order is rightfully terrifying.

Drug sales become open, almost brazen. Marijuana, crack cocaine and crystal methamphetamine are common offerings. Customers include people from the neighborhood and "drive-through" customers from elsewhere. Gangs may take over the apartments of members or members' families, at times virtually imprisoning their sometimes-unwilling hosts. Drug sales become the predominant activity for some gangs, generating large amounts of cash. This in turn can tempt a variety of people to steal, which leads to yet more shootings.

In some neighborhoods, the drug sales controlled by gangs are a major – perhaps the only major – economic activity. Thus, a gang may be the only significant local employer in an otherwise depressed neighborhood. This helps the gangs embed themselves in the social fabric of the area by providing a means of livelihood that the rest of society does not. More important, the gangs often provide the only avenue to material prosperity visible to young men and women in blighted, dangerous, desperate communities.

Gunfire is common. Shootings are frequent. Murder becomes part of everyday life, accompanied by the tragic accidental shooting of bystanders. One gang shoots at a rival. The rival and his friends extract revenge by return shootings. An endless cycle of insult, real or imagined, retribution, anger and revenge is ignited, killing young men and innocent bystanders without distinction.

Robberies and burglaries of ordinary residents increase in response to greater levels of drug sales. Gangs congregate around the homes of members, holding large, loud and frequently unruly parties. These parties can erupt in violence as gang members are targeted by rivals or fight among themselves.

Conventional enterprise in gang-dominated neighborhoods is almost impossible, unless storeowners are willing to meet extortion demands. Park facilities and other outdoor places of assembly are frequently taken over by gangs, making them far too intimidating and genuinely dangerous for others.

Perhaps most tragic is the situation of parents, many of them working people of modest means, who watch their children model themselves after gang members, then socialize with them, then work for them and finally graduate into full-fledged gang membership. Not infrequently, these children and young adults end up in prison, disabled or dead.

## **LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO GANG ACTIVITIES**

### **Gang Relations**

Law enforcement agencies have responded to criminal gang activities with dedicated staff and a range of coordinated programs. Legislation has been adopted that increases the penalties for gang-related crime and makes it easier to prosecute juvenile gang members as adults. Gang members are increasingly identified and tracked to determine their patterns of activity. Law enforcement officers – police and deputies alike – have made strong efforts to reach out to the

community. Although much remains to be done, these efforts have had notable success in opening lines of communication and improving mutual understanding between law enforcement officers and community residents.

Despite these efforts, law enforcement officers and prosecutors face formidable obstacles. Witnesses are reluctant to come forward, fearing – with some justification – that they may be harmed if they testify against gang members. Residents of the neighborhoods where gangs develop frequently fear the police and may be openly hostile to them. Within gang-dominated communities are long memories of prejudice and injustice, some of which are perceived to have been at the hands of police.

The gangs themselves make frustration of law enforcement in their territory a mark of distinction. One of their most effective and frequently employed tactics is the use of juveniles to carry out criminal activities on behalf of the gang. In response to this, legislation was passed several years ago that makes it easier to prosecute juveniles as adults for certain crimes. Gang members also take pride in refusing to cooperate with police investigation, refusing to testify against other gang members and, in some cases, even harboring fugitives.

Another factor complicates law enforcement responses to gang activities. At least some gang members – frequently the leaders – are intelligent, articulate and engaging. The harsh selection process that produces these individuals is effective in an ironic and terrifying way, producing street-smart, young “executives” with an oddly polished manner who are willing to engage in shocking violence as a normal part of their business life. Law enforcement officers have dealt with this by cultivating an extraordinary attitude of professionalism and professional courtesy that defuses both hostility and cleverness, while maintaining the officers’ dignity and self-respect.


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### **THE/SUPPRESSION/INTERVENTION/PREVENTION TRIANGLE**

As shown in Exhibit 1, the law enforcement community characterizes its activities with respect to gangs as a triangle, emphasizing suppression, intervention and prevention.



**EXHIBIT 1**  
**CITY OF LOS ANGELES/COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES:**  
**LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPHASIS ON**  
**GANG SUPPRESSION, INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION**



**For purposes of this management review, the following definitions were used for the Suppression/Intervention/Prevention Triangle.** (Note: The term "intervention" is more narrowly defined than may occur among some segments of law enforcement, prosecution and community groups.) The three "corners" of their efforts are:

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**Suppression** – The purpose of suppression is to:

- Stop flagrant criminal behavior
- Reduce the number of casualties suffered by everyone in the community as the result of gang activities and disputes
- Reduce the level of threat and intimidation directed at local residents who are not gang members.

This facet of the overall effort requires intensive law enforcement and prosecution in gang-dominated neighborhoods. Increased police activity is focused on intensive investigation of gang-related crimes. Dedicated prosecutors conduct "vertical prosecutions," in which a small team of prosecutors works with a LAPD division or LASD substation to ensure that repeat offenders are fully prosecuted. In a similar fashion, Probation Officers and Parole Agents may be detailed to the effort, concentrating their efforts on probationers and parolees in the involved neighborhood and ensuring that probation and parole conditions are fully enforced.

- **Intervention** – Once the most flagrant criminal conduct has been addressed, the next step in the process is intervention. The purpose of intervention is to reduce the gang’s domination of the allegiance and lifestyle of members and prospective members, increasing the possibility of the emergence of a healthy public lifestyle in the affected neighborhood. Intervention involves a reduction of public displays of gang identification, discouraging the gathering of gang members in public places and reducing or eliminating the display of items such as pagers that are frequently associated with drug sales in affected neighborhoods. Community groups and institutions may also work with some gang members to help them look for alternatives to gangbanging as a way of life.
  
- **Prevention** – With the flagrant selling of drugs and brandishing of weapons reduced, and the “hold” of the gang on a neighborhood weakened, prevention strategies focus on younger children and pre-teens not yet full members of a gang. Prevention strategies are intended to offer genuine hope of economic and social advancement to offset the perception by young people that the gangs offer the only meaningful association available to them. After school programs, “neutral zones” in schools and other community programs are intended to offer alternatives to a gang lifestyle to young men and women. This part of the overall anti-gang strategy can also include neighborhood improvements in streets, streetlights, utilities, parks and other public amenities to enhance the neighborhood’s place in the fabric of the larger city. Economic development programs and housing renovation may also play a part here.

### **DEDICATED LAW ENFORCEMENT UNITS**

Some of the key units are dedicated to gang issues within the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles are:

#### **County of Los Angeles**

- **Hardcore Gang Unit, Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office.** This unit is comprised of more than 50 Assistant District Attorneys who prosecute the most difficult gang murder and attempted murder cases in Los Angeles County. The Hardcore Gang Unit vertically prosecutes cases throughout the County, which means that one Deputy District Attorney handles each case (and individual) from time of arrest to verdict. The District Attorney chairs the Executive Board of Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR), described later.
  
- **Safe Streets Bureau, Operation Safe Streets (OSS) and Gang Enforcement Team (GET), LASD.** LASD has three gang-related initiatives: Operations Safe Streets (OSS), the Gang Enforcement Teams (GETs) and the Safe Streets Bureau. The mission of the Safe Streets Bureau is to take a leadership role in reducing gang violence and positively impacting the quality of life in the community through the vigorous

application of innovative law enforcement techniques. This concept is based on ethical practices and effective strategies that endorse the use of extensive prevention, intervention and suppression techniques that align the energies of families, schools, neighborhoods and other law enforcement agencies.

- **Probation Department.** The Probation Department is a member of CLEAR and the Inter-agency Gang Task Force (IGTF), both of which are discussed later.

### **City of Los Angeles**

- **Gang Unit, Los Angeles City Attorney's Office.** This is a specialized vertical prosecution unit within the City Attorney's Office dedicated to the enforcement of civil and criminal sanctions against gangs that fall within the jurisdiction of the City Attorney. The unit secures injunctions against targeted gangs, supports the civil and criminal enforcement of those injunctions and participates in the Inter-agency Gang Task Forces (IGTFs), discussed later, and the CLEAR program.
- **Gang Support Section, Special Operations Support Division, LAPD.** The Gang Support Section (GSS) is comprised of the Asian Crime Unit, the Gang Field Unit, the Administrative Unit, and the Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR) Coordinator. The missions of the GSS are to:
  - Identify and cause the arrest of active, violence-prone, career criminal gang members
  - Provide oversight and coordination of area Gang Impact Teams (GITs)
  - ~~Develop and maintain an automated system to track career criminals~~
  - Manage the CLEAR Program Grant.

GSS is also responsible for updating the City-wide gang database, monitoring and disseminating gang-related criminal statistics, developing an active parolee database, and serving as an agency liaison to the California Youth Authority (CYA) and County's Probation Department. GSS sits as a voting member of the California Gang Node Advisory Committee (CGNAC), which is responsible for the statewide oversight of gang-related information collection efforts.

Gang Enforcement Detail/CLEAR units gather gang-related intelligence and information, identify gang crime patterns, monitor gang activity and implement crime suppression strategies by:

- Establishing and maintaining a visible police presence in communities most affected by violent street gangs and gang-related street narcotics trafficking
- Deploying strategically to selected location during periods when criminal gang activity has occurred or is likely to occur
- Monitoring city parks, schools and other locations where gang members congregate
- Collecting and maintaining gang intelligence to prevent gang-related crime and/or identify and apprehend suspects
- Identifying and focusing efforts on the most active and violent gangs and their leadership to reduce the proliferation of gangs
- Developing and maintaining working relationships with other branches of the criminal justice system, including prosecutors, probation officers/parole agents, the City Housing Authority, neighboring municipal and County law enforcement agencies and other state and federal agencies
- Developing and maintaining ongoing relationships with community-based organizations, schools and religious institutions which provide youth programs as well as intervention/prevention programs
- Participating in community meetings where gang prevention, intervention and community involvement are the focus of discussion.<sup>4</sup>

□ **Gang Impact Teams (GITs), LAPD.** Criminal gang activity and narcotics trafficking are factors driving much of the violent crime in the City of Los Angeles. In response, LAPD has formed Gang Impact Teams (GITs) to facilitate the development of long-term gang and narcotics enforcement strategies, and to provide the increased supervisory oversight and accountability of Gang Enforcement Details ((GEDs) formerly Special Enforcement Units) required by the U. S. Department of Justice's Consent Decree applicable to LAPD operations.<sup>5</sup> GITs will:

- Revise and expand supervisory responsibilities as they relate to GEDs and CLEAR (GED/CLEAR) units
- Revise and expand crime suppression strategies for GED/CLEAR units
- Clarify the process for GED/CLEAR selections and extensions.

GITs will be established in a specific geographic area and will operate under the line command of an area commanding officer. Each GIT will be comprised of the following minimum components:

<sup>4</sup> Special Order No. 7, Office of the Chief of Police. February 25, 2004.

<sup>5</sup> United States v. City of Los Angeles, Board of Police Commissioners, and the Los Angeles Police Department (CV 00-11769-GAF (RCX) Rampart Cases), June 19, 2001.

- Gang Enforcement Detail (GED)
- A CLEAR Unit, where applicable
- Narcotics Enforcement Detail (NED)
- Investigation Detail
- Gang Crime Analysis Detail (G-CAD).<sup>6</sup>

## **COORDINATION OF PROGRAMS TO COMBAT GANG VIOLENCE**

### **THROUGH THE INTER-AGENCY GANG TASK FORCE (IGTFs)**

The City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office, LAPD, LASD, City Attorney's Office, County District Attorney's Office, County Probation Department and the Parole and Community Service Division of the California Department of Corrections work together as a team to combat criminal gang activities and gang violence. The primary means of coordinating the efforts of these agencies is the Inter-Agency Gang Task Force (IGTF). The County's IGTF regions include representatives from law enforcement, government agencies and other community stakeholders. Their aim is to develop effective strategies to combat gangs in their respective regions, such as:

- Identify changes in gang activity that require a response by law enforcement agencies
- Develop common approaches to gang violence and criminal gang activities in areas where gangs overlap city and county jurisdictions
- Share information on gang activities, methods and membership
- Develop common terms to measure gang activity and work toward a common data base to report it
- Develop common approaches in seeking resources from the State and Federal governments.

~~In addition to the efforts of law enforcement agencies, there are a number of government and non-profit agencies working to help current and prospective gang members find safer and more constructive ways to lead meaningful lives. The activities of these agencies, while of great value to the greater Los Angeles community, were beyond the scope of this review, and are not presented here except where they relate to law enforcement initiatives.~~

### **OTHER GANG-RELATED PROGRAMS**

CGIs are only one of several programs used by the law enforcement community to combat criminal gang activities. Given the gravity of the problem and the tragic consequences of unchecked gang activities, it is understandable that police and prosecutors are willing to try initiatives that offer a reasonable prospect for success. In addition, some communities respond better than others to particular programs. Among the prominent efforts, all coordinated through the IGTFs, are:

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<sup>6</sup> Special Order No. 7, Office of the Chief of Police. February 25, 2004.

□ **Civil Gang Injunctions (CGIs).** This effort requires the efforts of the City Attorney's Office, District Attorney's Office, LAPD and LASD. It is the subject of our report.

□ **Community Law Enforcement and Recovery (CLEAR).** CLEAR is a multi-agency<sup>7</sup> collaborative law enforcement effort that targets members of specific gangs who pose the greatest threat to a specifically defined community. By teaming with police, deputy sheriffs, probation officers, deputy city attorneys and others, prosecutors combat gang activity. Hardcore Gang Division prosecutors participate in six CLEAR sites throughout the County. CLEAR program sites include:

**City of Los Angeles:**

- LAPD Devonshire Division
- LAPD Foothill Division
- LAPD Newton Division
- LAPD Northeast Division
- LAPD Hollenbeck Division\*

**County of Los Angeles:**

- LASD East Los Angeles\*

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\*Joint efforts between the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles.

□ **Heightened Enforcement and Targeting (HEAT).** Deputy District Attorneys in the HEAT program work closely with local police to monitor and prosecute the most dangerous gang criminals. HEAT is similar to CLEAR, but it targets more specifically defined gang problems and activities that each community has identified. The program is tailored to each site and often focuses on juvenile gang activity. HEAT sites include:

- 
- Athens
  - Lancaster
  - Lennox
  - Long Beach (Juvenile)
  - Pasadena
  - Pasadena, Burbank and Glendale (Juvenile)

□ **Strategies Against Gang Violence (SAGE).** Prosecutors in the SAGE program are assigned to particular cities and communities to work proactively with law enforcement, residents, local officials, businesses and others in developing and implementing crime-combating strategies.

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<sup>7</sup> Involves LAPD, LASD, the City Attorney's Office, the District Attorney's Office, County Probation Department and the Parole and Community Services Division of the California Department of Corrections.

## **RECENT GANG-RELATED LEGISLATION**

In the last several years, the California legislature and voters, acting through the initiative process, have enacted laws intended to make more effective the efforts of police and prosecutors in dealing with juvenile offenses and specifically gang-related crime. These include:

- **The Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act.** Penal Code Sections 186.20 – 186.33, the STEP Act, enables prosecutors to seek enhanced penalties and longer sentences for gang members. It also provides an expanded definition of gang membership, provides for the abatement of building-related nuisances and requires convicted gang members to register in their county of residence.
  
- **The Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act (Proposition 21).** This act, passed by initiative in 2000, makes it easier – and in some cases mandatory – to prosecute as adults juveniles who commit certain crimes. It significantly increases the penalties for certain offenses committed by juveniles as young as 14, increases the penalties for gang-related crimes, and expands the definition of gang membership for the purpose of determining whether a crime is gang-related. Proposition 21 allows wider use of wiretaps and electronic surveillance to combat criminal gang activities. Finally, the act requires the state to establish and maintain a registry of known gang members.

## **CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS (CGIs)**

### **HISTORY**

It is not surprising that injunctions were developed in Los Angeles, where gang activity has historically been persistent and severe. In the early 1980s, law enforcement officers in Orange and Los Angeles Counties obtained a series of civil court injunctions to prohibit gang activity at specific locations in Santa Ana (1980), Pomona (1981), West Covina (1982) and East Los Angeles (1986). The Los Angeles City Attorney was the first to sue a gang as an unincorporated association in 1982. In 1987, a highly publicized injunction was issued against the Playboy Gangster Crips gang that, unlike others, covered the entire City of Los Angeles. The next injunction, issued in 1992, started a precedent of limiting the association of one defendant gang member with another. Injunction activity accelerated beginning in 1996 when a Southern California gang was enjoined, on average, every two months. Los Angeles County has two-thirds of the 31 injunctions granted in Southern California in the 1990s, while San Diego, Orange, San Bernardino and Ventura Counties issued the remaining one-third. In July 2003, the 17th injunction was implemented in Los Angeles County. While CGIs remain primarily a Southern California experience, other California communities are considering the strategy. Texas and other states have also used gang injunctions.

## LEGAL BASIS AND PROCESS

CGIs are one of several programs used by police and prosecutors to reduce gang violence and improve the living conditions in neighborhoods subject to gang activity. CGIs are founded on the assertion that criminal gang activities constitute a public nuisance that may be enjoined by an order of the civil court. Essentially, CGIs are civil proceedings that result in an injunction against both specific individuals and the unincorporated association that is the gang.

To obtain a CGI, prosecutors work with police in areas of high gang activity to gather information about the activities of gang members who are believed to constitute a public nuisance. These can include records of contact, known as Field Interview Cards, statements taken during police questioning of subjects and witnesses, arrest records and criminal convictions. The prosecutors ultimately complete their work, which can take as long as six months and involve hundreds of documents, into a series of declarations. The declarations are sworn (signed and witnessed by police officers under penalty of perjury) and become the foundation for a petition to the civil court for a preliminary injunction.

CGIs are the result of a civil litigation process governed by long-standing principles of due process and civil procedure. In the eyes of the court, they are not essentially different from the injunctive relief sought by any other petitioner before the court, and they must meet all applicable standards of evidence, due process and evidentiary standards. Prosecutors first seek a preliminary injunction. If it is granted, a judge schedules a hearing to decide whether to make it permanent. At that time, the people named in the petition can appear with their attorneys to contest the allegations against them.

Injunctions can include a wide range of remedies. Curfews can be imposed on gang members. Members named in the injunction can be ordered to refrain from associating in public with other gang members. ~~Gang members can be prohibited from gathering in certain areas. They may be ordered to refrain from blocking sidewalks or gathering in named housing units. They can be enjoined from riding together in automobiles, both in the area of the injunction and in rival gang territories.~~

After the petition is presented to the court, all individuals named in it must be served with legal notice of the complaint and the date of hearing. This is done by police officers and is one of the highly visible events in the CGI process. Large teams of officers are dispatched on a given date to serve these legal notices in the threatened neighborhoods where gang members reside and which are typically the neighborhoods they dominate. It is an indicator of the level of risk in such neighborhoods that notice is served by teams of three or four law enforcement officers.

If an injunction is granted, gang members can be cited for both civil and criminal contempt if they violate the terms of the injunction. Penalties can include fines of as much as \$1,000 and up to 6 months imprisonment. More importantly, law



enforcement officials no longer need a complainant at the scene if they are called to the site of a disturbance or other event in which gang members are violating the terms of the order. The CGI itself effectively serves as both probable cause for investigation and the complainant in case of a violation.

### **CGIs' ROLE IN THE STRATEGIC "TRIANGLE" OF SUPPRESSION, INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION**

CGIs are aimed at all three stages of gang-related response efforts.

- CGIs' most important impact lies in Intervention. Intervention is aided by specific prohibitions against gathering, presenting gang identifiers and displaying or using pagers or other communications devices.
- CGIs have played an important but lesser role in Suppression of gang activities by providing police and prosecutors with a tool to disrupt and confront gang members.
- CGIs have been shown to be a useful tool in bringing about the Prevention of further gang activities by reducing gang visibility and discouraging new gang membership.

### **CGI LITERATURE REVIEW**

On the basis of a survey of available research literature in the field, the most relevant points from the literature are highlighted next, but the Appendix contains a more detailed summary of the research.

### **CGI IMPACT**

The literature identifies several mechanisms by which CGIs may be effective.

- **The first, and most obvious, is deterrence, when gang members are threatened with punishment for the enjoined activities** (Maxson *et. al.* (2003a) (2003b)). The notifications of hearings and injunction papers may increase the perception by targeted gang members that they are being closely watched and are now more likely to be apprehended and prosecuted for violations (Klein, 1993). Vigorous policing and enforcement of an injunction is crucial to maintain this effect.
- **An additional CGI effect is a process of individualization that decreases identification with the gang** (Zimbardo, 1969). Social psychology suggests that individuals may feel less responsible for their behavior when they strongly identify with a group (Erikson, 1968). As Maxson suggests, being served with CGI papers may send the message to the particular gang members that they are being closely watched, and increase their sense of personal responsibility for their own behavior. In this process, identification with the gang might decrease, as could the

overall gang cohesiveness that is associated with violent gang activity (Klein, 1995).

- ❑ **CGIs may also work because of greater community empowerment**, an idea derived from social disorganization theory (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993). Maxson hypothesizes that the process of developing and implementing a CGI may engage community members in an overall effort to build informal social control, social capital and supportive organizational structures in neighborhoods where gangs arise. By reducing the level of the immediate threat of the gang to community residents, CGIs may lay a foundation for shoring up community control that reduces criminal activity. The Strategies Against Gang Violence (SAGE) manual of the Los Angeles District Attorney, as well as other injunction practitioner literature, emphasizes the community policing perspective as the ideological foundation for a CGI. When Mayor James Hahn was the City Attorney, he popularized CGIs in Los Angeles, contending that CGIs provide communities with the breathing space "to get those resources into the neighborhood, and once you get those established, gangs can't really come back and control everything" (*LA Weekly*, January 15, 1999). CGI goals are typically couched in community policing terms, such as solving specific community crimes, decreasing disorder and overcoming fear (Greene, 2003). Higher levels of community involvement and greater impact on community environments might be expected from CGIs developed and implemented with this philosophical orientation, as compared with other forms of gang enforcement (Decker, 2003).

### **IDENTIFIED CGI BENEFITS**

Literature and articles about CGIs cite the following benefits:

- ❑ Residents are relieved from particular actions by gangs that were bothersome before (e.g., the public feels safer going to the local parks where CGIs prohibit gangs from congregating).
- ❑ Residents gain a greater sense of control. They can anonymously report CGI violations to the law enforcement agencies, gaining substantially more leverage in their attempts to control gang activities.
- ❑ Vigorous law enforcement provides an excuse for some members to get out of the gang.
- ❑ Youth are less exposed to gang activities when gangs stay off the streets.

### **CGI DRAWBACKS**

At the same time, some scholars and community activists have expressed reservations about CGIs' widespread use.

- ❑ In some cases, a CGI may serve as a common threat that helps to unite a gang and induce retaliation against individuals.
- ❑ Gang activities might be displaced to the neighboring areas not covered by the CGI when other factors do not prohibit this.
- ❑ CGIs may not have any effect in the long run when gang members not named in the injunction become more active or when gangs learn how to get around the CGI, especially when enforcement is low.
- ❑ CGIs can further alienate youths, labeling them "forever" as gang members and making it more difficult to return to normal life, especially because CGIs do not provide positive alternatives.
- ❑ The suppression of a local gang may attract rival, neighboring gangs.
- ❑ CGIs limit the civil rights of individuals. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has challenged CGIs on those grounds but, to date, the California Supreme Court has ruled CGIs to be constitutional.
- ❑ A CGI requires substantial investment in resources 1) at the CGI preparation stage when evidence is collected and documents are presented and 2) in enforcement, which includes increased policing and injunction-related arrests. Some critics claim that these expenses could be spent on alternative prevention programs.

### **EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF CGI SUCCESSES**

The law enforcement agencies responsible for implementing CGIs perceive them as successful interventions and cite anecdotal evidence collected through interviews. Success is reported in multiple dimensions, including reduction in gang activity, the splintering of gang structures resulting from relocation of targeted gang members, decreases in crime rates and police calls and the increase in residents' sense of security.

Outside observers are not always as uniformly positive. An article in the Long Beach Press-Telegram,<sup>8</sup> focusing on CGIs in Long Beach, contained the following conclusions:

- ❑ One injunction was followed by reduction in crime rates, the other by an increase.
- ❑ Other gang-related programs were launched at the same time as the CGIs, making it difficult to attribute the changes in gang activity to the injunctions alone.
- ❑ Nearly 80% of the gang members named in the injunctions were convicted of at least one crime after the CGIs were imposed.

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.presstelegram.com/Stories/0,1413,204~29997~1770117,00.html>

- Out of 20 people named in the East Side Longos Injunction (2001), 4 were convicted of violating the injunction in the year-and-a-half after the injunction was implemented.

There is no systematic recording of the number of arrests in CGIs, but findings from interviews (conducted by Maxson et al (2003)) suggest that relatively few arrests and prosecutions typically result from CGIs. Newspapers report that often police prefer not to arrest for CGI violations, but to use them as a negotiation tool to extract information from the gang members (Long Beach Press-Telegram).

The most scientifically rigorous study was conducted by Grogger (2000), using data from 14 injunctions imposed in Los Angeles County between 1993 and 1998. He established a control group of 14 areas which he compared to 14 areas in which CGIs were imposed. He then contrasted crime rates in the control and CGI areas. From his analysis, Grogger concluded that reported violent crimes fell on average between 5 to 10 percent<sup>9</sup> compared with the pre-injunction period. The largest crime reductions were concentrated in assault, while the effect on the reduction in robberies was less pronounced. In contrast, CGIs affected neither murders nor rapes. Finally, this study uncovered no evidence of the displacement of criminal activity into adjoining areas due to an injunction.

This study has a number of limitations in interpreting CGI effectiveness. Due to limited data availability, the study measures only the effects of injunctions on murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault, while other gang-related problems for which injunctions are believed to be the most effective (e.g., drug-related crimes, residents' sense of safety) are not measured. It is also possible that CGIs are part of a wider strategy involving other programs, which were launched together. In such cases, one cannot attribute the entire crime reduction effect to any one initiative.

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### **C. MEASURABLE IMPACT OF CGIs ON CRIME PATTERNS**

The objective of this data analysis is to estimate the effects of CGIs on crime in target areas as well as areas adjacent to the target areas. To do this, a statistical trend analysis of crime statistics over a 14-year time period (January 1990 through March 2004) was undertaken. Because of the commitment and experience with CGIs within LAPD and Office of the City Attorney, the data analyzed pertain to the City of Los Angeles.

#### **DESCRIPTION OF CRIME DATA**

Reported crimes are not an absolutely direct measure of the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts. A number of forces affect the number of Criminal Complaint

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<sup>9</sup> The upper boundary excludes injunction areas affected by the Rampart police scandal, where injunctions were suspended in some cases, possibly decreasing their effectiveness. Thus, the average effect of crime rate reduction increases.

Reports (CCRs), including citizen trust in the police, the policy of senior police officials, demographics<sup>10</sup> and overall police morale. Nonetheless, CCRs are the most objective measure easily available over the period of time that CGIs have been in use and, therefore, were applied to this study. Three types of measures of crime are relevant to this study:

- **Total Crimes.** Total Crimes are tabulations of all crimes, including Part 1 and gang-related crimes.
- **Part 1 Crimes.** Part 1 Crimes are the eight "serious offenses" for which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) gathers national data, including:
  - Homicide
  - Rape
  - Robbery
  - Aggravated Assaults
  - Burglary
  - Larceny
  - Vehicle Theft
  - Arson<sup>11</sup>.

Part 1 Crime statistics are subject to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program. Although participation is strictly voluntary, most law enforcement agencies participate in it. Therefore, Part 1 Crimes are the most reliable data source with the greatest consistency across police divisions and over time.

- **Gang-related crimes.** Gang-related crimes are the direct measure of the effects of injunctions, but inconsistency in gang-related crime data limits its use. One reason is that there are several competing concepts about gang crime. At one end, some argue that any crime committed by a gang member should be included. At the other end, some argue that only crimes clearly motivated by gang dynamics or rivalry should be included. Some would exclude narcotics offenses from gang-related crimes, arguing that the sale of narcotics is an illegal business that would exist in our communities with or without gangs. In addition, crimes can be reclassified into or out of the "gang-related" category as investigators uncover more evidence about specific crimes. Another complicating factor is that the definition of gang-related crimes may change over time. For these reasons, consistency<sup>12</sup> in reporting gang-related crimes across police

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<sup>10</sup> For example, people who speak English-as-a-second language are not believed to report crimes as often.

<sup>11</sup> Arson was not originally part of the crime reporting process. Arson became the eighth Index crime as the result of a limited Congressional mandate in October 1978. With the passage of the Anti-Arson Act of 1982, arson was permanently designated as reportable.

<sup>12</sup> Comparisons of the data provided by LAPD Information Technology, reports from individual LAPD divisions and crime statistics published on the LAPD website reveal

divisions over time is problematic, which makes it difficult to estimate the effects of CGIs on the level of gang-related crimes.

Although CGIs are supposed to have the most effect on gang-related crimes, the ultimate goal is to reduce total crimes and severe crimes. Therefore, in this analysis, the focus is on Part 1 Crime and Total Crime statistics.

The analysis is based on reported crimes. Injunctions may change the proportion of crimes reported to police or deputies either by encouraging victims or witnesses to come forward or forcing crimes to go underground. As a result, analysis of reported crimes would be biased because of the effects injunctions may have on reported crime levels. Instead, this analysis addresses the question of whether injunctions have spillover effects (i.e., injunctions merely displace gang activities and lead to increases in crime levels outside target areas).

LAPD furnished the data. The data contain information on all types of crimes within LAPD's jurisdiction. Crime data were extracted from back-up tapes of the LAPD mainframe computer system. The extracted data provided incident level statistics for the period from January 1990 through March 2004. LAPD has various levels of reporting data, including 4 police bureaus, 18 police divisions and 1,168 Reporting Districts (RDs). Data were reported by:

- Police Bureau, Division and RD
- Docket number
- Date and time of occurrence
- Specific crime-type code.

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discrepancies. The inconsistency problem of gang-related crime data is confirmed by law enforcement agencies.

**A total of more than 4.8 million data entries were analyzed. We collapsed the raw crime data into crime counts<sup>13</sup> by RD and quarter-year, totaling 58,324 observations.<sup>14</sup>** Crime counts rather than crime rates were more useful because<sup>15</sup>:

- Population data at the RD level are currently not available<sup>16</sup>.
- For small areas such as RDs, residential population may not be a good measure of "risk set" (i.e., the total number of persons at risk of being victimized in the RDs because of high level of population flow in these areas).

Figure 1 shows the crime trend from 1<sup>st</sup> quarter 1990 to 1<sup>st</sup> quarter 2004 in the City of Los Angeles.

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
<sup>13</sup> One incidence of crime can face multiple charges. In our analysis, we counted multiple charges on the same incidence as one crime.

<sup>14</sup> There are 8,252 missing values in the data due to either zero number of crimes for some RDs in certain periods or changes in the division of RDs over time. It turns out most of the missing values are due to missing data in periods: 1<sup>st</sup> quarter 1990 - 4<sup>th</sup> quarter 1992; 1<sup>st</sup> quarter 1990 - 4<sup>th</sup> quarter 1994; 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter 1992 - 1<sup>st</sup> quarter 2004; and 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter 1992 - 1<sup>st</sup> quarter 2004. These time periods account for 6,063 missing values or 73% of the missing data. This is probably the result of splitting or merging of RDs and therefore no action was taken. In the other cases, zero number of crimes is assigned to the missing periods according to the observed crime trends before or after the missing periods. For example, when the number of crimes before and after the missing periods is low or close to zero, zero number of crimes is assigned to the missing periods. Later analysis shows that the results are not sensitive to this adjustment.

<sup>15</sup> Also discussed by Grogger in his paper "The Effects of Civil Gang Injunctions on Reported Violent Crimes: Evidence from Los Angeles County", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XLV, April 2002.

<sup>16</sup> Although RDs are comparable to Census tracts, matching them is beyond the scope of this study.


**FIGURE 1:  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES:  
CRIME TRENDS FOR TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**



Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes have similar trends while gang-related crimes are volatile, as shown in Figure 2.



**FIGURE 2:  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES:  
GANG-RELATED CRIME TRENDS**



Source: [www.LAPDonline.org](http://www.LAPDonline.org)

The study by Grogger uses crime data from 1992 to 2000, in a period when crimes had been constantly declining.<sup>17</sup> This study's data cover periods when crimes had been declining and periods when crimes had been rising, which allowed a study of CGI effects when crimes are declining and when crimes are rising. The effects found by Grogger might be solely due to the fact that crimes decline faster in areas with high levels of crime than in areas with low levels of crime, especially when crime counts are used as the measure of crime level.

**SCOPE OF INJUNCTIONS STUDIED**

The study included 14 injunctions in the City of Los Angeles, as shown in Table 1.

**TABLE 1:  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES:  
14 INJUNCTIONS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS**

Gang Name in Injunction	Timing of When Preliminary/Permanent Injunction Granted
Bounty Hunters	October 1, 2003/December 2, 2003
Rolling 60s	October 1, 2003/November 24, 2003
Avenues	January, 29, 2003/April 7, 2003
KAM	October 25, 2002/January 17, 2003
18 <sup>th</sup> Street Pico Union	No preliminary injunction/October 18, 2002
Canoga Park Alabama	February 25, 2002/April 24, 2002

<sup>17</sup> Grogger's research is based on a sampling of LAPD data.

Gang Name in Injunction	Timing of When Preliminary/Permanent Injunction Granted
Pacoima Project Boys	No preliminary injunction/August 22, 2001
Culver City Boys	June 3, 1999/January 27, 2001
Venice 13	March 17, 2000/January 12, 2001
Harbor City Boys and Harbor City Crips	January 12, 2000/February 1, 2000
Venice Shoreline Crips	July 21, 1999/October 18, 2000
Langdon Street	May 20, 1999/February 17, 2000
Harpys	August 04, 1998/July 17, 2000
Blythe Street	Under appeal until 1998/February 17, 2000

Four other injunctions were excluded for reasons shown in Table 2.

**TABLE 2:  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES:  
FOUR INJUNCTIONS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS**

Gang Name in Injunction	Preliminary Injunction Granted	Reasons not Included in The Analysis
18 <sup>th</sup> Street (Jefferson Park)	July 10, 1997	Injunction is currently in litigation; the City Attorney does not comment or release information on matters before a court.
Mara Salvatrucha (MS)	April 13, 1998	This was an old injunction granted in a different area and since discontinued; a new MS injunction was granted April 8, 2004.
Shatto Park Locos	June 9, 1998	This injunction was tainted by the Rampart scandal; enforcement was suspended in 1999; and the injunction was subsequently dismissed.
Columbia Little Cynos	June 9, 1998	This injunction was tainted by the Rampart scandal; enforcement was suspended in 1999; and the injunction was subsequently dismissed.

Table 3 shows the location of each injunction and the number of RDs targeted by each injunction.

**TABLE 3:  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES:  
14 INJUNCTIONS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS**

Gang Name in Injunction	LAPD Division	Number of RDs Covered
Bounty Hunters	Southeast	3
Rolling 60s	77 <sup>th</sup> Street	9
Avenues	Northeast	15
KAM	Hollenbeck	3
18 <sup>th</sup> Street Pico Union	Rampart	6
Canoga Park Alabama	Devonshire; West Valley	17
Pacoima Project Boys	Foothill	2
Culver City Boys	Pacific	7
Venice 13	Pacific	9

Gang Name in Injunction	LAPD Division	Number of RDs Covered
Harbor City Boys and Harbor City Crips	Harbor	3
Venice Shoreline Crips	Pacific	5
Langdon Street	Devonshire	2
Harpys	Rampart; Southwest; Newton	12
Blythe Street	Devonshire	6

## **STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS**

To estimate the effects of injunctions on crimes, ideally one needs to know what the crime level would have been had injunctions not been implemented in the target areas and then take the difference of crime levels with and without injunctions. To do so, all RDs were classified into target areas, adjacent areas, neighboring areas and other areas. Target areas include RDs covered by the injunctions; adjacent areas include:

- RDs sharing boundaries with target areas
- Neighboring areas include RDs sharing boundaries with adjacent areas

Adjacent areas are important to assess to determine if there are any "spillover" or "displacement" effects (i.e., migration of crimes to adjacent areas). The rest of the RDs are included in other areas.

Because there are multiple injunctions, one RD can be classified as a target area according to one injunction and as an adjacent area according to another one. For purposes of this analysis, the following distinctions were made:

- Target RDs** – RDs classified as target areas and adjacent areas or target areas and neighboring areas
- Adjacent RDs** – RDs classified as adjacent areas and neighboring areas.

Neighboring areas were used as control groups to estimate:

- The crime level in the target areas
- The crime level in adjacent areas had injunctions not been implemented
- The effects of injunctions on crimes in the target areas and spillover effects in the adjacent areas.


## **CRIME TRENDS, USING THE SIMPLE DIFFERENCE-IN DIFFERENCES METHOD**

The Difference-in-Differences method compares the mean change in the crime level within the target areas before and after the CGIs were implemented with the contemporaneous mean change in the crime level in the comparison areas. This method can produce unbiased estimates of the effects of injunctions on crime level by controlling for the factors that drive common crime trends in both the target and comparison areas (as long as those factors have the same effects


on crime activities in the target areas and the comparison areas). Another important assumption underlying Difference-in-Differences method is that the characteristics of both the target areas and comparison areas stay constant over time.

Figure 3 and Figure 4 show Total Crime and Part 1 Crime trends respectively in the four types of areas, just defined.

**FIGURE 3:  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES:  
AVERAGE NUMBER OF TOTAL CRIMES  
(Quarterly Averages)**



**FIGURE 4:  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES:  
AVERAGE NUMBER OF PART 1 CRIMES  
(Quarterly Averages)**



Although crime level in neighboring areas are lower than in target areas, they show similar trends over time; and, therefore, neighboring areas may serve as a good control for common crime trends. Another surprising finding is that, for Part 1 Crimes and Total Crimes, crime level in adjacent areas is generally lower than crime levels in neighboring areas, even lower than crime levels in other areas in periods before 1999.<sup>18</sup>

Given that CGIs occurred at different time periods, it was necessary to define "before" and "after" injunction periods. To define the "before" period, a longer pre-injunction period is preferred to a shorter pre-injunction period, because a longer pre-injunction period provides a more accurate baseline against which to estimate the mean change before and after the CGIs were implemented. In contrast, the longer the pre-injunction period, the more likely the characteristics of the target areas and comparison areas have changed. Such a change could result in biased estimates of the effects of CGIs on crime levels. The Difference-in-Differences approach was estimated by using various lengths of pre-injunction periods and the results are not sensitive to the specification. The effects of CGIs were estimated for 2 quarters, 4 quarters, 6 quarters, 8 quarters, 10 quarters and 12 quarters after the injunctions were implemented. With these estimates,

<sup>18</sup> The study by Grogger has similar findings.

the changes in the crime levels could be assessed over time, to determine if the CGI effects are sustainable. Some CGIs have less than 12 quarters of post-injunction period:

- Bounty Hunters and Rolling 60s with 2 quarters of a post-injunction period
- Avenues with 5 quarters of a post-injunction period
- KAM and 18<sup>th</sup> Street Pico Union with 6 quarters of a post-injunction period
- Canoga Park Alabama with 9 quarters of a post-injunction period.

Excluding these injunctions from the analysis, however, does not significantly change the results.

- **Total Crime Statistical Trends.** Table 4 shows the results of injunctions on Total Crimes. The estimates indicate that injunctions reduce Total Crimes by 2.92 per quarter or 3.4% in 2 quarters after the injunctions were implemented, 3.07 in 4 quarters, 2.75 in 6 quarters, 3.10 in 8 quarters, 3.16 in 10 quarters and 1.91 in 12 quarters. The magnitude of these estimates is quite stable over different post-injunction periods, although most of them are statistically insignificant. No spillover effects are found in Total Crimes.
- **Part 1 Crime Statistical Trends.** Table 5 shows the estimates of the effects of injunctions on Part 1 Crimes. In the target areas, the average quarterly Part 1 Crimes are 52.17 in the pre-injunction period and 46.15 in the post-injunction period (2 quarters after injunctions were implemented). The difference is an 11.5% reduction<sup>19</sup> in Part 1 Crimes in target areas. This may overestimate or underestimate the effects of injunctions depending on the common trend of Part 1 Crimes as estimated by using the comparison areas.

In the comparison areas or neighboring areas, the average quarterly Part 1 Crimes are 46.04 in the pre-injunction period and 42.97 in the post-injunction period. The difference is a 6.7% reduction<sup>20</sup> in Part 1 Crimes per quarter.

Because Part 1 Crimes decrease across all RDs during this period, only part of the 6.02 reduction in Part 1 Crimes in the target areas can be attributed to the injunctions. The Difference-in-Differences estimate is the difference between total reduction in the target areas and total reduction in the comparison areas (-2.95)<sup>21</sup>. The 2.95 difference is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Therefore, the Difference-in-Differences method shows that injunctions reduce Part 1 Crimes by 2.95 per quarter within 2 quarters after the injunctions were implemented, which represents a 5.6% reduction in Part 1 Crimes. The estimate is -

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<sup>19</sup> 46.15 - 52.17 = -6.02

<sup>20</sup> 42.97 - 46.04 = -3.07

<sup>21</sup> -6.02 - (-3.07) = -2.95

1.00 in 4 quarters after the injunctions were implemented, -0.08 in 6 quarters, -0.08 in 8 quarters, -0.08 in 10 quarters and 0.21 in 12 quarters. All estimates with post-injunction periods longer than 2 quarters are statistically insignificant.

The Difference-in-Differences method does not find significant spillover effects by comparing the before and after change in the adjacent areas and in the neighboring areas.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> The estimate is 0.35 in 2 quarters after the injunctions were implemented, -0.70 in 4 quarters, -0.70 in 6 quarters, 0.05 in 8 quarters, 0.11 in 10 quarters and 0.96 in 12 quarters and all estimates are statistically insignificant.

**TABLE 4:  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES:  
THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS ON TOTAL CRIMES --  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES**

Reporting Districts	Total Crimes												
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-Injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)	
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error) <sup>23</sup>	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	85.60	78.67	-6.93 (1.66)	77.93	-7.68 (2.05)	77.80	-7.80 (2.14)	77.67	-7.93 (2.47)	78.00	-7.60 (2.87)	78.54	-7.06 (3.21)
Adjacent	64.97	61.31	-3.66 (1.25)	59.66	-5.31 (1.63)	59.22	-5.75 (1.88)	60.19	-4.78 (2.15)	60.64	-4.33 (2.40)	60.77	-4.20 (2.61)
Neighboring	71.89	67.88	-4.01 (1.12)	65.76	-6.12 (1.57)	65.15	-6.74 (1.77)	65.55	-6.34 (2.06)	66.17	-5.72 (2.34)	66.73	-5.15 (2.58)
			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target			-2.92 (2.00)		-3.07 (2.58)		-2.75 (2.78)		-3.10 (3.22)		-3.16 (3.70)		-1.91 (4.12)
Adjacent			0.35 (1.68)		-0.70 (2.26)		-0.70 (2.58)		0.05 (2.98)		0.11 (3.35)		0.96 (3.67)

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

\*\*\*: Significant at 1%; \*\*: Significant at 5%; and \*: Significant at 10% for Difference-in-Differences estimates.

<sup>23</sup> Standard error compares the difference between the two means.



**TABLE 5:  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES:  
THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS ON PART 1 CRIMES –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES**

Reporting Districts	Part 1 Crimes												
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)	
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error) <sup>24</sup>	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	52.17	46.15	-6.02 (1.19)	46.56	-5.61 (1.38)	47.04	-5.13 (1.42)	47.26	-4.91 (1.68)	47.65	-4.52 (1.97)	48.24	-3.93 (2.21)
Adjacent	42.38	38.39	-3.99 (0.87)	37.79	-4.59 (1.00)	37.72	-4.67 (1.19)	38.26	-4.12 (1.40)	38.50	-3.88 (1.58)	38.74	-3.64 (1.75)
Neighboring	46.04	42.97	-3.07 (0.79)	41.43	-4.61 (0.97)	40.99	-5.05 (1.09)	41.21	-4.83 (1.27)	41.60	-4.44 (1.46)	41.90	-4.14 (1.61)
			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target			-2.95**		-1.00		-0.08		-0.08		-0.08		0.21
			(1.42)		(1.69)		(1.79)		(2.11)		(2.45)		(2.73)
Adjacent			-0.92		0.02		0.38		0.72		0.56		0.50
			(1.17)		(1.39)		(1.61)		(1.89)		(2.15)		(2.38)

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

\*\*\*: Significant at 1%; \*\*: Significant at 5%; \*: Significant at 10% for Difference-in-Differences estimates.

<sup>24</sup> Standard error compares the difference between the two means.

## **FIXED-EFFECTS REGRESSION ANALYSIS**

The simple Difference-in-Differences approach uses the before-and-after change in the comparison areas as a control for common crime trends to estimate the net effects of CGIs. This method implicitly assumes that factors other than CGIs have exactly the same effects on crime levels in both target areas and comparison areas. The Fixed-Effects method estimates the effects of CGIs on crime level by explicitly modeling RD specific characteristics and time trends in crime levels. The Fixed-Effects method models crime level by RD and quarter while the Difference-in-Differences method compares crime levels between target areas and comparison areas before and after the CGIs. Therefore, the Fixed-Effects method could potentially yield more accurate estimates. Also in the Fixed-Effects methods, RDs can be classified as target areas in some periods and as adjacent areas or neighboring areas in other periods, or as adjacent areas in some periods and as neighboring areas in other periods, and this may generate better comparisons and estimates.

The Fixed-Effects model can be described as:

$$y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * CGI_{i,t} + \beta_2 * ADJ_{i,t} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Where:

- *y* is the outcome of interest: either Total Crimes or Part 1 Crimes in the case of linear model, and log Total Crimes or log Part 1 Crimes in the case of Log-linear Fixed-Effects model.
- *i* indexes RDs.
- *t* indexes time (quarter-year).
- $CGI_{i,t}$  indicates whether RD *i* is in the target areas at time *t*.
- $ADJ_{i,t}$  indicates whether RD *i* is in the adjacent areas at time *t*.
- $\alpha_i$  is RD fixed-effects and  $\gamma_t$  is time fixed effects.
- $\varepsilon_{i,t}$  is an independently identically distributed (i.i.d.) error term.
- Parameter estimate for  $\beta_1$  shows the effects of injunctions on crime level.
- Parameter estimate for  $\beta_2$  indicates whether there are any spillover effects.

Table 6 shows the estimates from linear Fixed-Effects model. Overall, CGIs reduce:

- ❑ Part 1 Crimes by 2.86 per quarter, which represents a 5.5%<sup>25</sup> reduction in Part 1 Crimes, although it is statistically insignificant
- ❑ Total Crimes by 4.63 per quarter, which represents a 5.4%<sup>26</sup> reduction in Total Crimes and is statistically significant at the 10% significance level.

No spillover effects are found for Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes.

<sup>25</sup> Use 52.17 per quarter as the baseline as in the Difference-in-Differences method.

<sup>26</sup> Use 85.60 per quarter as the baseline as in the Difference-in-Differences method.

**TABLE 6:  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES:  
THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
LINEAR FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATES**

Time Frames	Part 1 Crimes		All Crimes	
	Effects of Injunctions	Spillover Effects	Effects of Injunctions	Spillover Effects
Overall	-2.86 (2.06)	2.16 (1.91)	-4.63* (2.45)	1.48 (2.28)
1-4 quarters	-4.33** (2.00)		-4.98* (2.60)	
5-8 quarters	-1.70 (2.52)		-4.11 (3.00)	
9-12 quarters	-1.97 (3.15)		-5.06 (3.91)	
13 quarters or above	-2.06 (3.73)		-4.29 (4.41)	

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

\*\*\*: Significant at 5%; \*\*: Significant at 10%.

There are generally more crimes in target areas than in adjacent areas and neighboring areas. When crimes are declining, crime levels in high crime areas decline faster than in low crime areas in terms of number of crimes. In contrast, when crimes are rising, crime levels in high crime areas rise faster than in low crime areas in terms of number of crimes. In this case, the percentage change may be a better measure of change in crime levels than change in number of crimes. The parameters from Log-linear models can be interpreted as the percentage changes in the outcome for one unit change in the intervention. For example,  $\beta_1$  can be interpreted as the percentage change in crime levels due to the injunctions.

Table 7 shows the estimates from the Log-linear Fixed-Effects model. Overall, CGIs reduce:

- Part 1 Crimes by 8.0% -- which is statistically significant at the 5% significance level
- Total Crimes by 8.0% -- which is statistically significant at the 5% significance level.

No spillover effects are found for Part 1 Crimes and Total Crimes.

**TABLE 7:  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES:  
THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
LOG-LINEAR FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATES**

Time Frame	Part 1 Crimes		All Crimes	
	Effects of Injunctions	Spillover Effects	Effects of Injunctions	Spillover Effects
Overall	-0.077** (0.035)	0.010 (0.034)	-0.080** (0.038)	-0.005 (0.032)
1-4 quarters	-0.088*** (0.033)		-0.071** (0.035)	
5-8 quarters	-0.039 (0.038)		-0.060 (0.042)	
9-12 quarters	-0.078 (0.056)		-0.089* (0.053)	
13 quarters or above	-0.102 (0.072)		-0.112 (0.075)	

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors  
 '\*\*\*': Significant at 1%; '\*\*': Significant at 5%

To compare CGI's short-term versus long-term effects, the effects of injunctions were also estimated for 1-4 quarters, 5-8 quarters, 9-12 quarters and 13 quarters or more after the injunctions were implemented, as shown in Table 7. The Linear Fixed-Effects model shows that there are large and significant effects in 1-4 quarters with 4.33 per quarter or 8.3% reduction in Part 1 Crimes and 4.98 per quarter or 5.8% reduction in Total Crimes. There are sizeable effects after the first 4 quarters but they are not statistically significant. The Log-linear Fixed-Effects model shows similar results.

### **SUPPORTING DATA ANALYSIS**

Appendix B contains the supporting data for the 14 CGIs analyzed for both Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes from the 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter of 1990 through the 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2004.

### **CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION**

Using 1990-2004 crime data from LAPD, the Difference-in-Differences method, linear Fixed-Effects model and Log-linear Fixed-Effects model were applied to estimate the effects of CGIs on crime levels. The hypothesis that CGIs simply displace crime activities outside the target areas was also tested. Part 1 Crimes and Total Crimes as our measures of crime level were used because of inconsistency problems with the classification of gang-related crimes.

## **STATISTIC IMPLICATIONS**

All three models show similar results. There are strong short-term effects of injunctions. On average, CGIs reduce Part 1 Crimes by 5.5% to 8.8% and Total Crimes by 3.4% to 7.1% in the first 2 to 4 quarters after the CGIs were implemented depending on the estimation methods. The Difference-in-Differences method shows no long-term effects on Part 1 Crimes, but the Fixed-Effects model suggests there are smaller long-term effects on Part 1 Crimes, although not statistically significant. Both the Difference-in-Differences method and Fixed-Effects models show less evidence that injunctions have sizeable long-term effects on reducing Total Crimes.

Both the Difference-in-Differences method and Fixed-Effects model try to control for factors such as common crime trends and RD characteristics in estimating the effects of CGIs. There are still other factors that are not accounted for and may bias the estimates. For example, it is not precisely known how police enforcement in the target areas changed after CGIs were implemented, and there might be other programs initiated to reduce gang activities or crime levels in the target areas at the same time, such as CLEAR. Also, crime-reporting behaviors might have changed after CGIs were implemented. Without specific information on these programs, one cannot differentiate their effects from the total effects found in the analysis.

No spillover or displacement effects are found in any of the models. But this could be due to the fact that the effects are too small to be detected because the displaced crime activities were spread into large adjacent areas.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

- 1. In the first year of implementation, CGIs cause a significant reduction in both Part 1 Crimes and Total Crimes.** For about a year after the granting and enforcement of a CGI, both Part 1 Crimes and Total Crimes decrease significantly. *Part 1 Crimes decrease 6% to 9% and Total Crimes decrease 3% to 7%.* These decreases are statistically significant, and the breadth of this analysis indicates that the decrease is the result of the enforcement of the CGI or some activity intimately associated with it. These findings coincide with those published by Grogger (as discussed in the previous section on the Literature Review).

Seldom do outcomes of public initiatives produce results of this clarity. The independent analysis of data conducted as part of this study do not simply suggest that lower crime rates are somehow related to CGIs, or that CGIs might be influential with respect to crime rates. *These data indicate that CGIs do in fact cause a reduction in Part 1 Crimes and Total Crimes.* This is a strong finding and indicates that *the CGI effort is a successful weapon against criminal activity.*

At the same time, it should be noted that several of the CGIs included in this analysis were part of larger efforts, primarily through (but not exclusively) CLEAR. The effects of the combined programs could not be dissociated, and

so this analysis may be measuring their combined impact in the first year. If that is the case, then it is the combination of efforts that is so effective.

2. **Although the results fall short of strict statistical cause-and effect thresholds, both Part 1 Crimes and Total Crimes are lower in succeeding years.** Beyond the first year, areas subject to a CGI show decreases in both Part 1 Crimes and Total Crimes, but these increases do not rise to the level of statistical significance. These results suggest that there may be a long-term effect associated with CGIs, but the cause-and-effect relationship is not as apparent as it is in the first year after the CGI is issued and enforcement begins.

From a programmatic and management perspective, however, there is still strong evidence that CGIs are successful. Seldom do the outcomes of public programs of this type show such clear and unequivocal results. Although statistical causality cannot be demonstrated beyond the first year, it appears that areas subject to CGIs show relatively lower overall crime rates. In subsequent sections of this report, a number of steps are outlined that should enhance the "out-year" performance of CGIs.

3. **There does not appear to be significant displacement of crime from CGI areas to adjacent neighborhoods.** Crime rates in adjacent neighboring areas did not show significant increases in either Part 1 Crime or Total Crime. No spillover or displacement effects were found in the statistical analysis. The areas surrounding the CGI boundaries are large enough that small spillover effects might not be noticeable. The fact that there are not measurable spillover effects, however, is significant.
4. **Although the overall trend in reported crimes was downward, experience varied noticeably among CGIs.** We have shown the results for each CGI in the detailed analysis contained in Appendix B. Continued investigation to identify the differences between these areas and their results would be fruitful and should be pursued. It would be particularly interesting to identify CGIs associated with CLEAR sites or other intensive law enforcement efforts to determine whether there is a significant enhancement in effectiveness that can be credited to the combined effort.
5. **Areas selected for the implementation of CGIs generally showed high and volatile Part 1 Crime rates prior to the enforcement of the injunction.** Crime rates in these areas continued to show volatility even after the injunction was issued and enforcement began. This suggests that there is a strong underlying potential for criminal activity in these neighborhoods and that, at least in most cases, the City has selected genuine high-crime neighborhoods as targets for CGIs.

## Discussion

These results are a close fit with the themes of the site interviews conducted with a cross-section of the law enforcement community. In the interviews, there was a consensus that CGIs are an effective tool in combating gang crime. The data

appear to strongly support that perception and seem to confirm CGIs as a potent approach to reducing Part 1 Crimes and Total Crimes, both independently and in combination with other efforts.

The analysis results also appear to support the interviewees' perceptions that continuing support and retraining of enforcement staff is necessary to maintain the momentum of CGIs that have been in effect for some time. Beyond the first year, CGI target areas or "safe zones" show reduced levels of crime. The differences in these "out years" do not meet the scientific hurdle of 95% probability of a causal relationship, although they are still clearly related. This lower level of effect suggests that, as time goes on, enforcement efforts are not as vigorous as they are at the beginning of the CGI. Some CGIs appear to be more effective than others. These results support the arguments for:

- Long-term support and development of CGI efforts
- Continued research to identify particularly effective CGI efforts
- More analysis of the long-term effect of CGIs.

Over time, crime continues but the magnitude is smaller. The CGIs' effect on crime is less certain. This demonstrates the experience that has led experts in the field to argue for long-term support and development of CGI efforts. The results also support continued research to identify particularly effective CGI efforts, and to analyze more fully the long-term effect of CGIs.

#### **D. FINDINGS**

##### **DATA, TREND ANALYSIS AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENTS**

**Finding 1: No single law enforcement agency or joint agency effort has successfully measured the outcomes of efforts to reduce gang crime and violence.**

To some extent, this situation is understandable. "Gang-dominated" neighborhoods are under siege. Residents are afraid to walk the streets. Drugs are sold openly. Gunfire is common at night and unsurprising in daylight. Gang members, some barely in their teens, are routinely shot. Many are killed. Bystanders are also in danger of being injured or killed. Some of them are young mothers; others are their children. To counteract this, resources seem woefully inadequate when compared to the gravity of the consequences of gang domination. Under these circumstances, the emphasis – rightly – is on stopping the killing, by any available means, as quickly as possible.

The result of the measurement problems is that policy differences appear to be based more on intuition and experience than rigorous measurement of outcomes. LAPD, LASD, the City Attorney's Office, the District Attorney's Office, Los Angeles County Probation Department and the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services do try to work toward common approaches through the IGTF, but their discussions do not appear to be based on the careful analysis of outcomes.

Law enforcement agencies do attempt to assess their progress. Each agency has some form of internal review, and the IGTF meets regularly to identify and respond to issues within the IGTF regions. There is little in the way of careful outcomes measurement. In the past, there has been a perception within the law enforcement community that such measurement was unlikely to produce significant results, or – worse – that the data might suggest that ongoing efforts were either ineffective or actually deleterious. This investigation suggests strongly that neither of these concerns is supported by the facts.

- ❑ **Each agency has developed its own approach to gathering data.** There appears to be a lack of organized, consistent data that gives a clear picture of progress – or lack of it – in the abatement of gang activity and gang-related crime. Both the LAPD and LASD keep a variety of statistical records related to crime levels, and they conduct analyses that identify trends. These statistics, however, are not easily related to activities of a specific program or initiative, and overall crime statistics seem to rise and fall in response to larger social and economic trends that appear unrelated to actions by the law enforcement community.
- ❑ **LASD lacks trend data and related analyses.** There did not appear to be readily available data within LASD that tracked gang crimes in all areas, including unincorporated areas, where the Sheriff's deputies provide law enforcement.
- ❑ **Each agency has its own point of view, based on the experience of the people who work with gangs.** Where experiences or assumptions vary, however, there is a dearth of sound data to help reconcile them. The CLEAR Executive Board has developed a program model for the CLEAR Program and has taken steps to try to understand the effects of CLEAR on the communities where it is implemented. This effort includes a substantial data collection element and the retention of a third-party oversight contractor. The data collected are limited to CLEAR sites, however, and there are no immediately available estimates of the resources required to achieve those results.
- ❑ **Definitions of gang crime are inconsistent between agencies and, at times, within agencies.** Gang crime definitions can vary from one law enforcement agency to another. In some cases, definitions are not always consistent within the same police agency. Beyond that, definitions of gang crimes, gang-related crimes and gang-motivated crimes tend to vary in ways that reflect the values and strategies of the agencies that develop them. This year, LAPD has begun to work toward more consistent definitions<sup>27</sup>. LAPD has also recently assigned Lieutenants to each of its Gang Impact Teams. One of the anticipated benefits of this deployment is expected to be greater consistency of gang crime definitions.
- ❑ **Data processing equipment and systems are unique to each agency and, in many cases, obsolete.** Existing data are fragmented and

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<sup>27</sup> Special Order No. 3, Office of the Chief of Police. January 28, 2004.



inconsistent (discussed next), and access to available data is hampered by obsolete data processing equipment. Gathering data for this report required the use of cumbersome and obsolete tapes, which could only be read and reconfigured using special equipment. Even then, the data was not in standard ASCII format, and several weeks of effort were required to get even partially useful information.

Due to these problems, it is difficult to track and analyze the results of efforts to reduce gang crime and gang activity. Outcomes that cannot be anticipated on the basis of experience and intuition are difficult to identify and even more problematic to support. For example, the statistical analysis suggests that a strong secondary effort is needed to address gang behavior about a year after the initial enforcement effort begins. Although there was a consensus that long-term support was needed, no one in the community interviewed was able to identify the timing of that support specifically.

**Finding 2: Assessing the effectiveness of different strategies is hampered by the lack of data and ability to track program costs.**

Without strong measurement data and effective models, it is difficult to demonstrate to the City and the County budget authorities – themselves beset by far more demands than their resources will accommodate – that CGIs, alone or in combination with other approaches, are effective. It is also difficult to assess objectively whether expanded or reduced resources are the appropriate course to follow, and whether CGIs are a productive investment of public funds.

None of the law enforcement entities could segregate the costs associated with gangs or CGI programs. It is possible only to vaguely estimate the costs associated with CGIs. Therefore, it is difficult to clearly answer questions about the balance of costs and benefits for CGIs.

As just stated, the costs of the program can only be generally estimated. Similarly, exactly how a CGI impacts gang behavior is not measurable, and benefits of reduced gang behavior and violence are not readily measurable. There is substantial statistical evidence that CGI efforts reduce Part 1 Crimes. On balance it appears the impact of CGIs is positive. To more systematically address this issue, we would look to ask three questions:

- **Can resources devoted to gang suppression, intervention and prevention be reduced if CGIs were eliminated?** Demand for gang related law enforcement exceeds available resources throughout the Los Angeles metropolitan area. This has been true for some time, and the situation is now even more critical than ever due to the State's current financial crisis. Resources devoted to law enforcement are established through a political process which weighs anticipated benefits against an avalanche of alternative demands, including, for example, health, welfare and education. Even considering only law enforcement resources, leaders are regularly forced to make difficult decisions about which activities and individuals to investigate, prosecute or monitor. Defendants are regularly

allowed to plead to lesser offenses than the serious crime committed because there are not enough courts or prosecutors to try the accused in a timely manner. The scarcity of police officers and deputy sheriffs in the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles, respectively, is a common element of public discourse. On this basis, the expansion or cessation of CGIs would not materially affect the availability of resources for other law enforcement or gang suppression activities. Resources would simply be devoted to other law enforcement activities.

- **Do the financial and non-financial benefits of the measurable outcome exceed the financial inputs of the CGI?** We will not attempt to quantify the anguish and emotional prices of the individual tragedies associated with the negative impacts of gangs on neighborhoods and individual lives. The LAPD estimates that the cost to the City of one murder is approximately \$3 million. This does not include the financial loss suffered by families; nor does it include the incalculable loss to friends and family resulting from the murder of a child, a teenager or young adult.

When the negative impacts of gangs are effectively addressed by CGIs, a community is positively affected by:

- Improved neighborhood activity, including safety in walking the streets, fewer loud gang gatherings and improved access to safe parks.
- Improved environment for legal commercial activity
- Reduced visible drug sales
- Reduced incidence of shootings of gang members and unintended victims of gun violence
- Lower gang membership
- Fewer juvenile felons.

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It is possible to financially quantify many of these benefits. For example, one could gather information about property values, the number of new businesses in targeted areas, the potential lifetime earnings of victims of violence and the reduced lifetime earnings of felons. That said, it is difficult to isolate the CGIs' impact on those measures. For example, property values are affected by interest rates, the quality of schools, proximity to transportation and work opportunities, quality of the housing stock and the overall market availability of buyers and sellers. Reduced gang behavior, while indisputably making for a better neighborhood, might not affect any of the other factors.

On the cost side of the equation, none of the participating agencies were able to develop accurate estimates of costs associated with gang injunctions or gang-related activities. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that the costs are significantly less than the impact of gangs on community and human life.

- **Will an alternate strategy or use of the resources generate a better outcome?** This question would be easier to answer if CGIs were the only

tool used in Los Angeles's gang-infested areas to achieve gang suppression, intervention and prevention activities. In fact, it is only one of the weapons used because CGIs alone are not always sufficient. When CGIs are combined with programs (such as CLEAR), they appear to be useful. Isolating the effect of the resources devoted to implementing CGIs was not possible in the context of this study. Beyond that, the police and prosecutors working to reduce gang-related crime and violence know that lives are literally in the balance. They cannot ever hope to stop all of the drug sales, all of the shootings, all of the senseless killings of innocent bystanders. They have literally sworn to do everything they can, knowing that it will never be enough. Under these circumstances, those charged with law enforcement in gang-impacted neighborhoods make every effort, employ every tool and try every approach their limited budgets will allow that shows the promise of positive results.

**Finding 3: Data analysis shows a significant short-term reduction in Part 1 Crime in the first year of CGI implementation.**

On the basis of the analysis, it is evident that there is a demonstrable reduction in Part 1 Crimes due to CGIs in the first year of their implementation. The findings of the analysis are as follows:

- ❑ **CGIs appear to cause a short-term reduction in Part 1 Crime.** For about a year after the granting and enforcement of a CGI, Part 1 Crimes decrease. These decreases are statistically significant, and the decrease is the result of the enforcements of the CGI or some activity intimately associated with it.
- ❑ **CGIs may deter Part 1 Crime in the long term, although the data do not show a clear cause-and-effect relationship.** Beyond the first year, areas subject to a CGI show decreases in Part 1 Crime but these decreases are not statistically significant. These results suggest there may be a long-term effect associated with CGIs; however, a cause-and-effect relationship is harder to demonstrate after the first year of the injunction.
- ❑ **There does not appear to be significant displacement of crime from CGI areas to adjacent neighborhoods.** Crime rates in adjacent neighborhoods did not show significant relative increases, adding to the existing evidence that CGIs do not result in "spillover" crimes.

**STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIMINAL GANG ACTIVITIES**

**Finding 4: CGIs are an important part of a larger strategy to reduce and confront criminal gang activities.**

**CGIs are widely viewed by law enforcement professionals as a useful tool.** There is a substantial consensus among the District Attorney's Office, the City Attorney's Office, the LAPD and LASD that CGIs are one element of an effective response to criminal gang behavior. At all levels of the law enforcement

community, experienced staff members cite CGIs as important in the struggle to stabilize gang-dominated neighborhoods. There is a particularly strong consensus in the City Attorney's Office that CGIs are effective in combating gang activities. The City Attorney's Office was a pioneer in advocating and pursuing these injunctions, and members of the Office continue to express confidence in their efficacy. They believe that the civil rights of gang members are adequately protected by the due process of the civil litigation that leads to the injunctions, and they believe that the injunctions, if vigorously pursued, reduce gang violence.

- **Both Sheriff's deputies and LAPD police officers expressed confidence in CGIs.** Their experience suggests that the injunctions are useful in disrupting gang activities. They point to the fact that, once an injunction has been issued, it effectively provides them with probable cause to stop and detain individuals who appear to be in violation of the injunction. This is especially important to police officers, who are often confronted with people who know of criminal activities, but who fear retaliation if they come forward. With an injunction in place, law enforcement officers can respond to a report of gang activity and detain suspects who appear to be in violation of the CGI; they no longer require complainants to step forward and expose themselves. Law enforcement officers feel that this significantly enhances their effectiveness in gang-dominated neighborhoods, and encourages residents to report gang activities when they occur. Injunctions also make more difficult the conduct of illegal business, because law enforcement officers are empowered to stop known gang members who are congregating on the street in the CGI area. Some of those meetings are attempts to discuss illegal activities without being overheard. With in-person communications prohibited in public, some gangs have attempted to use cell phones to conduct their businesses. Some of those conversations have been legally intercepted by law enforcement agencies with serious crackdowns on the gang members.

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In the experience of the law enforcement community, CGIs help to suppress flagrant illegal behavior by gangs. Among other things, the injunctions prohibit gang members from congregating in public areas; harassing or intimidating community members; holding loud, late parties; or cruising through the neighborhood in automobiles. If gang members violate the injunction, law enforcement officers can arrest them without seeking a specific citizen complaint. If residents have been thoroughly briefed on this ability – as frequently happens in the community outreach associated with CLEAR sites – they are more likely to call in their complaints, allowing the law enforcement officers to intervene before a particular situation becomes volatile or attracts attention from a rival gang. Law enforcement officers credit CGIs with helping to reduce the rate of gang shootings by forcing gang members off the streets.

- **Labor intensive despite the benefits.** Some prosecutors have concerns about the effort required to obtain an injunction. They willingly acknowledge that the injunctions are effective in disrupting gang activities, but they are less sure that the injunctions are the most effective way to apprehend and

convict repeat felony offenders – the primary targets of the District Attorney’s Office.

- **Fewer gang targets for rival gang members.** Vigorously enforced, a CGI will reduce gang members’ ability to congregate in public places. It has been well established in the literature that individuals will undertake more extreme actions as members of groups than they will by themselves. As it becomes more difficult for gang members to assemble – this is one of the more common prohibitions in a CGI – there are correspondingly fewer occasions where groups of gang members loiter together. This results in fewer opportunities for someone to be challenged or intimidated into an act of violence.

At another level, gang members standing on street corners, in parking lots or on the front lawn of a dwelling are targets for rival gangs. If their rivals decide to intimidate a gang, or if they seek revenge for some real or imagined insult or injury, groups of gang members standing or sitting in a public location provide ready targets. When CGIs are effective, it is much more difficult for gang members to do this, since they are often subject to arrest and fine or imprisonment for congregating under the terms of the injunction. The net effect of this is to reduce the number of gang groups in the neighborhood, thereby reducing the number of targets for their rivals.

- **CGIs are key to the Intervention and Suppression strategies against gangs.** Perhaps most important from an intervention standpoint, violations of the CGI are misdemeanors. Law enforcement officers can enforce the injunction swiftly and vigorously, knowing that the cumulative effect of the injunction violations will be much less damaging to the individual’s prospects than would be the case with a felony conviction.

Once flagrant gang crimes have been abated, a CGI can be effective in reducing the overall level of public gang activity. It also deters young men and women in the neighborhood from becoming full-fledged gang members. A CGI, vigorously enforced, can result in the arrest of new recruits for lesser violations related to gang injunctions before they go on to more serious crimes. These young men and women can then, at least at times, be diverted into counseling and community programs before they commit more serious offenses.

**Finding 5: CGIs have a greater lasting impact when combined with other law enforcement initiatives, community and family commitment and concerted community development.**

Once CGIs and other law enforcement efforts have reduced crime and gang dominance in a community, these benefits can be most effectively sustained with a combination of active law enforcement and concerted community development. Community and economic development are ultimately the best strategy to combat the development and proliferation of street gangs. Opportunities in gang-dominated neighborhoods include:

- Expanded, community-based treatment for drug and alcohol addiction
- Community, business and individual developmental training designed to provide higher levels of personal confidence and interpersonal skills
- School improvements, including physical repairs, landscaping and security enhancements
- Sanitation sweeps to remove debris and discarded items
- Trimming, maintaining and replacing street trees as needed
- Street and sidewalk repairs
- Sidewalk maintenance
- Street light repair and maintenance
- Repair and replacement of street furniture, especially for bus stops
- Installation of bus shelters
- Public transportation improvements
- Job training
- Home ownership assistance and counseling
- Microplan programs to assist the founding of home-based or other small businesses.

Law enforcement and community development agencies must join forces with community groups, faith-based organizations and neighborhood leaders so the community can take a stand against gang activity and gang crime. This cannot take place unless law enforcement can establish a level of security that will permit community leaders to take a public position against the gangs. Once this has happened, however, it is essential for men and women of courage and conviction to come forth and speak out against the cycle of crime and violence bred by gangs. The effort should be carried out right down to individual families so that parents can take the same stand with their children. Educational programs designed to help parents support their children in staying out of gangs would be desirable.

The other critical area where the community can address gang behavior is in the schools. Some schools already have active programs, including after school study and athletic programs. Other schools forbid the wearing of gang colors, in some cases by establishing specific school dress standards. The schools could engage in open and frank discussion of gang behavior and its consequences in ways that would drive home to the students the frequently tragic consequences of gang membership.

One encouraging development in this area is the Greater L.A. Project sponsored by Pete Carroll and the University of Southern California. This project is designed to help law enforcement and community-based organizations (CBOs) support each other toward the common goal of reducing and preventing the gang violence. Efforts such as this, which seeks to bridge real differences in perception and strategy, could have a significant effect on outcomes if pursued with patience and vigor.

**Finding 6: CGIs by themselves have a limited impact on gang violence and criminal behavior.**

By themselves, CGIs can have only limited impact on gang behavior. They do not directly address rampant drug sales or the tragic cycle of insult, shooting and revenge that can send gang-dominated neighborhoods spinning into violence. It is true that CGI provisions can include banning the wearing of pagers, prohibitions against public association, assembly in public places and even riding together in the same car in a rival gang's territory. All of these provisions, if enforced, reduce the number of situations in which gang violence is likely. They cannot, however, replace intensive investigation and enforcement efforts targeted at the hard-core gang members responsible for so much trouble in already-troubled communities.

Many gangs support themselves by selling illegal drugs. Such crimes are not the subject of an injunction, although some related behavior, such as the carrying of pagers or cell phones, can be. Selling drugs is already illegal – and a felony at that – so it does not need to be enjoined by court order. Unless law enforcement officers are able to at least limit drug sales by a gang, it is difficult to reduce overall gang activity. Although a CGI can address related behavior, it cannot be used to make cases against gang members for the possession and sale of drugs. That requires the concerted efforts of local investigators, LAPD or Sheriff's Department-wide narcotics detectives, and perhaps Federal law enforcement officers. That is one reason why CGIs are seen as part of a larger approach to gang crime and violence.

LAPD has calculated that 10% of criminals account for 50% of crime in its jurisdiction. Therefore, in most gang-dominated areas, there will be a small group of individuals who account for the bulk of the major crimes in the community. These individuals are often intelligent and frequently violent. A concerted effort by law enforcement investigators and prosecutors is required to assemble evidence and conclude successful prosecutions, and this effort is separate from a CGI initiative. These individuals must be removed from the community through intensive law enforcement work to reduce crime to tolerable levels.

To return civil order to gang-dominated neighborhoods, LAPD or LASD, on occasion narcotics investigators, and perhaps dedicated illegal weapons investigators must collaborate to assemble evidence and carry out quality arrests. Once that is done, prosecutors, probation officers and Parole Agents must work together to ensure that, once convicted, habitual offenders will not be given easy opportunities to return to their old neighborhoods and habits. Then – and perhaps only then – will such intervention initiatives as CGIs be able to stabilize neighborhoods.

**Finding 7: Effective CGI implementation offers a potential path to law enforcement professionals to divert youthful offenders before they get felony records.**

If a young person is convicted of a serious felony, he or she faces serious consequences. This is especially true for offenses involving drug sales ("possession with intent to distribute"), felony assault or manslaughter. Individuals convicted of such crimes are likely to be sentenced to an adult prison for at least 5 years, and in many cases for longer.

When released, they find themselves with permanent societal disabilities. Convicted felons may not vote. They are ineligible for many kinds of jobs, including almost all forms of public employment. They cannot be bonded – a requirement for most trucking and delivery jobs. Only a lucky few find genuine rehabilitation programs, and even fewer are able to take advantage of them to start a new life. The most common outcome is a return to the old neighborhood, to old acquaintances, to old habits and ultimately to the life of crime and violence, which resulted in their initial incarceration.

A second felony conviction is virtually the social and financial ruin of an individual. The few potential employers who might take a chance on someone convicted of a felony are even less likely to hire a “two time loser.” Such individuals, with few exceptions, are eligible only for work as minimum wage workers or as participants in illicit enterprises. And the most common illicit enterprises available are generally the drug sales operations being run by their very own gang. This process produces hard, violent, essentially unreachable young men and women whose only practical prospects are long-term prison sentences or death at the hands of rivals, fellow gang members or the authorities.

CGIs give law enforcement officers, prosecutors and even gang members another option. Gang members who have not yet become trapped in the cycle of felony conviction, ruined prospects and further violent crime can be actively prosecuted for CGI violations. These violations, although they can carry fines and short jail sentences, are misdemeanors – much less damaging to the people convicted of them than are felonies. A misdemeanor conviction – even several of them – does not prevent the person convicted from voting, obtaining a visa or being considered for wide ranges of employment. There are still prospects in the “straight” world for individuals convicted of these violations. The dedicated men and women who work to divert young people from gangs have many more options where this approach is applied.

**Finding 8: CGIs are effective against gang activities that meet specific criteria.**

In determining whether a CGI will be effective, participating agencies consider key criteria.

- **CGIs are used against territorial gangs, which dominate specific neighborhoods.** As a CGI can only prohibit behavior in a limited area, it is critical to assure that the gang will not simply move their activities to an adjacent location not covered by the CGI. Therefore, the targeted gang must be territorial. Some limits on movement may be geographic. Others are imposed by rival gangs. Others are affected by multi-generational gang links to specific areas. Even when many gang members move to another community, they often return to “terrorize” their former home base. Some gangs are not territorial, however; they live in one area and conduct their activities in another, sometimes far away. Such gangs are not good candidates for injunctions and must be addressed through other means.



- **Another important criterion is that the patterns of gang activity include regular public gathering, outdoor activity and cruising.** The injunctions are most effective when they permit the law enforcement officers to interrupt public activity, such as gathering on street corners to intimidate or harass passers-by or cruising to enforce gang territorial claims.

**Finding 9: CGIs are most effective when combined with other initiatives, such as CLEAR, because of the resources brought to bear in the CLEAR program.**

Law enforcement entities in Los Angeles support the combination of a CLEAR site and a CGI as effective in reducing the impact of gangs on communities. The CLEAR site provides additional resources and substantially increased levels of law enforcement and prosecution. Among the most often mentioned enhancements are the assignment of dedicated Deputy Probation Officers (DPOs) to Divisions and Substations.

As the DPOs gain experience with local gang members, they prepare more accurate pre-sentencing reports, and their caseload allows them to provide effective supervision of probationers. The assignment of Parole Agents to conduct at least occasional sweeps of CLEAR sites is also noted as an important element. Parole Agents have broad authority to question and search the persons and property of parolees, and the threat of parole violations is a powerful one.

A CGI multiplies the effectiveness of these additional resources. The information gathered to support a CGI forms a solid background for the intensified enforcement of a CLEAR program. The law enforcement officers can act quickly and effectively to remove gang members who violate the CGI from the street without endangering residents brave enough to complain. The net effect of this combined assault on criminal behavior by gangs significantly reduces the ability of gangs to function at the same time the CLEAR program is building cases against the repeat serious offenders in the gang.

An additional benefit is impaired gang communication. Gang members must stay off the streets because the injunction forbids public association. That means that they must communicate more by telephone – but those telephones may be tapped in the course of the CLEAR program, exposing key gang members to prosecution if they discuss planned or current criminal activity on the telephone.

In summary, the CLEAR program attacks serious crimes and career criminals. Its intent is to apprehend and remove from the community those who commit multiple felonies, particularly crimes of violence. The CGI broadens and magnifies the pressure on gangs by interfering with their ability to control a neighborhood by congregating in public, intimidating residents and roaming the streets in cruising automobiles. The combination of these programs appears to reduce gang activity to the point that residents are once again granted peaceful enjoyment of public places, and can complain about annoying or threatening behavior without fear of retribution.

**Finding 10: CGIs require ongoing support if they are to be effective over time.**

- **CGIs need the support of law enforcement agencies in their initial phase to maximize their impact and effectiveness.** Throughout the CGI enforcement effort, adequate resources need to be devoted to assure the ongoing effectiveness of the injunctions. Gang membership changes as time goes on, and amendments to the court order may be needed. This entails the gathering of evidence, preparation of declarations and civil litigation. Law enforcement officers routinely rotate to different assignments, and their successors must be trained in the specifics of the injunction and the proper enforcement practices. Commanding officers are transferred, and their successors must be briefed and in some cases convinced that the CGI benefits justify the substantial resources that may be needed to support them.

As already noted, there are many benefits when DPOs are available to work with gang units. Namely, they are able to:

- Work with many youthful offenders so that they will not be incarcerated in juvenile detention facilities
- Question, investigate and, if necessary, detain probationers, interrupting potentially troublesome behavior
- Prepare sentencing recommendations for those convicted of crimes and recommend severe or reduced sentences.

This enhances the effectiveness of the CGI. Similarly, when Deputy City Attorneys are available to gang units, they can help to ensure that the CGIs are sustained in court, and provide effective assistance to the Gang Impact Teams in enforcing the injunctions once they are granted.

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Data analysis shows that CGIs are clearly effective in the first year of enforcement, with measurable but less clear-cut results in the second year and beyond. This is consistent with the consensus of the law enforcement community that sustained support is needed to maintain the benefits of the initial law enforcement effort.

- **CGIs will not be effective at sustaining reduced gang participation without additional community and economic development resources.** Although gang activity may decline, the problems that give rise to gang behavior do not automatically go away. Only consistent efforts across the broad spectrum of the community – including but by no means limited to the law enforcement officers and prosecutors – will be sufficient to keep vulnerable neighborhoods from slipping back into a cycle of criminal enterprise, civil disorder and violence. Prevention activities entail economic opportunity, education and other community and family support to youngsters who would otherwise be tempted by gang activities.

## **INTER-JURISDICTIONAL COLLABORATION**

**Finding 11: CGIs require the commitment of key leaders within both law enforcement and prosecution agencies if they are to be effective.**

As already discussed, CGIs do not serve to increase the level of resources available to law enforcement and prosecutors. In addition, with the possible exception of the City Attorney, there is little dedicated funding for the effort. There are individuals who devote all or most of their time to CGIs in the District Attorney's Office, LASD and LAPD. The work that these individuals do, however, is essentially a reallocation of existing resources. They do not represent a net addition to any agency. Because of that, CGIs must maintain the support of senior executives and commanders in all of the concerned agencies. Continuing CGI efforts mean that resources desperately needed elsewhere are being allocated from a resource pool that, at best, has not increased in the past few years.

Support must also extend deeply into the local law enforcement community. Even given a commitment by top leaders in several agencies, the pressures faced by the Commanding Officers at LASD Substations and LAPD Divisions are enormous. They are constantly pulled in several directions at once, and the demands on them consistently exceed the resources with which they can respond. Under these circumstances, CGIs cannot be effective unless these commanders believe in them; assign people to obtain and enforce them; and allocate overtime, supplies, equipment and space to the effort. In fact, there is anecdotal evidence that some of the less successful CGIs may have been substantially impaired by a failure to enroll key police commanders in their usefulness.

**Finding 12: The City of Los Angeles places more sustained and consistent focus on CGIs than Los Angeles County, due in part to the differing ways the function is handled between the City and County.**

The City and County approach CGIs differently:

- **City of Los Angeles.** The City of Los Angeles supports its CGI effort with dedicated staff in the City Attorney's Office. Given the nature of the City Attorney's mission, Deputy City Attorneys are usually experienced civil litigators. They are familiar with civil procedure and the mechanisms of the civil courts. Beyond that, City Attorney's Office pioneered the aggressive use of CGIs as a means of moderating gang activities, and succeeding City Attorneys have continued their support for the program. As a result, the CGI group in the City Attorney's Office has been provided with resources, staff and leadership support for its mission.

The City Attorney's Office and LAPD are both committed to CGIs as an effective tool. Many LAPD Gang Detail officers are familiar with the CGI process, and understand what must be done to obtain one and enforce it. They have had significant experience in using an injunction, and now know how to employ it to disrupt gang activities. They are also, by now, confident

of the result. They know that if they employ an injunction vigorously, they will be able to keep gangs from returning to "ownership" of a neighborhood.

- **County of Los Angeles.** The situation in Los Angeles County is slightly different. Sheriff's deputies assigned to gang crimes are usually part of the Investigators' Section. They work as hard as they can, as long as they can, to help those gang members they can, and to arrest and incarcerate those they cannot. The District Attorney assigns a full-time Deputy District Attorney (DDA) to work with the deputies assigned to the Hardcore Gang Division. The District Attorney is dedicated to meeting LASD's needs in this arena.

The deputies must deal with all of the crime in the Substation's area that calls for Investigators. In the Hardcore Gang Division, this ordinarily means a steady workload of murder and manslaughter. The DDAs generally are not dealing with cases where the District Attorney will accept a plea bargain. They are taking defendants to trial where the normal minimum term of incarceration for conviction is 25 years to life. Resources are frequently inadequate to meet even those workload demands. In fact, while the number of gang murders has increased in recent years, the Sheriff's involvement in CGIs has not increased and only one DDA is assigned to the Hardcore Gang Division.

If the number of the Sheriff's requests for CGIs change, this could pose workload problems for the District Attorney's Office. The County's DDAs are criminal prosecutors and their specialty is California criminal law. To provide support for CGIs, they must reacquaint themselves with civil procedure in general and the idiosyncrasies of the Los Angeles County Civil Court in particular. Thus, this learning curve may overburden the District Attorney's Office because a DDA's capacity is limited and difficult to expand.

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of the injunctions – is that they ever find time to help LASD pursue one.

**Finding 13: There are jurisdictional issues associated with setting up injunctions that cross physical boundaries between LASD and LAPD.**

**Areas covered by injunctions generally fall within the boundaries of a single LAPD precinct or division.** But gangs do not recognize the LAPD or LASD jurisdictions when they set up their operations. Because of the difficulty of gathering sufficient justification for injunctions, it is easier for those who are responsible for establishing CGIs to work with staff from a single jurisdiction. Therefore, a CGI is not a readily available tool to fight a gang when it operates in an area that is the split responsibility of LAPD and LASD.

## E. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on the background information developed, data collection, the crime experience data analyzed and the consensus of the experienced law enforcement officials contacted. They are intended to support and reinforce the efforts of the dedicated men and women who work hard to deal with the tragic and frustrating issues that surround gangs and the people who join them.

The recommendations include the conviction that the most effective approach to reducing criminal gang behavior and crime is a combination of concerted law enforcement efforts, such as CLEAR and CGIs. Experience indicates that this combination is effective in reducing criminal gang activities. Beyond the term of the CLEAR effort, vigorous enforcement of a CGI is generally accepted as a strong intervention strategy, extending the gains won by CLEAR and slowing the re-escalation of gang activity.

Neither suppression nor intervention strategies address the blight, poverty, injustice and hopelessness that provide such fertile ground for the growth of gangs. Lasting improvement in gang-dominated communities requires investment in restored public amenities, focus and coordination of available community service organizations and the encouragement of patient private-sector investments. Without strong law enforcement, no one will invest in blighted neighborhoods. Without investment, blighted communities will remain poor and desperate, and gangs will continue to prosper in them. And as gangs grow stronger, our entire society pays the price in an impaired economy and the tragic death of both gang members and innocent bystanders.

### **DATA, TREND ANALYSIS AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENTS**

<b>Recommendation 1: LAPD and LASD should continue and enhance efforts to improve the quality and consistency of the definition and reporting of gang crimes.</b>
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To measure outcomes and the effectiveness of CGIs and other gang-deterrent initiatives, common definitions, criteria, data gathering and analysis are necessary. Special Order No. 11, 2000, *Activation of the CAL/GANG System and Gang File Guidelines*, established the CAL/GANG System as LAPD's only authorized database and case management system on gang members. Since then, LAPD has identified the need to refine the procedures for collecting and maintaining gang-related information to conform to State standards<sup>28</sup>. Once violent crimes are determined to be gang-related, LAPD should monitor them statistically to assess the level of gang crime in an area.<sup>29,30</sup> LASD should enforce similar procedures.

<sup>28</sup> In the future, LAPD's area GIT Officer in Charge will approve the gang-related crime classification. When the classification cannot be determined at the area level, the Bureau Gang Coordinator will make the determination. When the Bureau Gang Coordinator cannot determine the classification, the Commanding Officer, SOSD, will make the final determination.

<sup>29</sup> The statistically monitored gang-related crimes are:

- Murder
- Attempted murder

- **Common definitions.** Common definitions of gang crimes would allow comparable reports by multiple jurisdictions. This would support efforts including two or more police agencies to combat gang crime as a joint mission. It would also be easier to make early identification of the adaptations gangs make to each law enforcement initiative. In addition, the process of reaching a consensus could help agencies reconcile policy differences.

The definition of "gang crime" or "gang-related crime" can vary from agency to agency. Definitions also seem to change somewhat over time, and may even vary within jurisdictions as one command adapts the definition of gang crime to meet local needs. This means that crime rates may not always be comparable, and it introduces an element of uncertainty in determining whether a program or innovation has had the desired effect. (Note: Inconsistency with gang-related crime definitions is not unique to California. It is also a nationwide issue.)

- **Law enforcement and gang membership criteria.** In the State of California, the CAL/GANG Executive Board that oversees the operation of the CAL/GANG System statewide has established the following criteria for identifying individuals as gang members or gang affiliates. These criteria should serve as good starting point for common definitions.

- **Gang membership criteria.** Indicators of gang membership shall include at least two of the following criteria<sup>31</sup>:

- Individual admits to being a gang member in a non-custodial situation.
- A reliable informant or source has identified the individual as a gang member.<sup>32</sup>

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- Felony assault
  - Assault on a police officer (includes battery, assault with a deadly weapon, and attempted murder on a police officer)
  - Robbery
  - Shots fired into an inhabited dwelling
  - Kidnap
  - Rape
  - Arson
  - Witness intimidation (includes criminal threats)
  - Extortion
  - Carjacking
  - Gang-related narcotics violations (Felony, Health and Safety Code Sections 11350, 11351, 11352, 11357(a), 11358, 11359, 11360, 11370.1, 11377, 11378, and 11379).

<sup>30</sup> Special Order No. 3, Office of the Chief of Police. January 28, 2004

<sup>31</sup> When two or more of these criteria are met, a gang officer will complete a CAL/GANG Card for entry into the CAL/GANG System.

<sup>32</sup> This includes the required registration by court order as described in Penal Code Section 186.30.

- An untested informant or source with corroboration has identified an individual as a gang member.
  - Individual is wearing gang attire.
  - Individual has been seen displaying gang hand signs or symbols.
  - Individual has gang tattoos.
  - Individual frequents gang areas.
  - Individual openly associates with documented gang members.
  - Individual has been arrested, alone or with known gang members, for a crime consistent with usual gang activity.
- **Gang affiliate criteria.** An individual, who meets only one of the above criteria and is linked with a documented gang member, may be designated as a gang affiliate and entered into the CAL/GANG System.<sup>33,34</sup>
- **Data access and usefulness.** As already noted, there are several sources of information regarding gang behavior, gang-related crime and law enforcement efforts to address it. LAPD has a rich pool of data and has recently increased the sophistication of its analysis. There is much accumulated wisdom in the experience of its officers, but that has not yet been distilled into a coherent theory of gang behavior. LAPD also finds it difficult to capture all of the cost information that pertains to gang abatement activities. In some cases, data on gang crimes reported by the Divisions seems to vary from that reported Department-wide. In others, gang crime data reported on the Department's website appears to vary from month to month as investigations reveal additional information. These weaknesses erode confidence in the core information set required to measure the outcomes of gang crime suppression and intervention strategies. They also make it difficult to validate theories pertaining to gang crime and behavior.
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- **Gang trends.** LASD cannot readily prepare information on gang crime trends for the totality of the areas where it provides services. LASD polices contract cities and unincorporated areas, which include urban communities, suburbs, "exurbs," and agricultural enclaves, as well as areas of open desert and mountain wilderness. It is a significant challenge to collect, assemble and synthesize information from these diverse sources. In many cases, it is not desirable; there is too much risk of masking local issues in a specific area. On balance, it appears that the judgment of experienced deputies would be strengthened if it were complemented by better data on outcomes. LASD appears to have strong cost accounting and reporting systems, possibly because of its long history of contracting to provide law enforcement services for local municipalities. These, however, have not been applied in ways that provide easily accessible information on the cost of gang crime suppression and intervention.

<sup>33</sup> The gang officer will document the name of the documented gang member with whom the affiliate is associating, the gang member's date of birth and his/her CAL/GANG number on the affiliate's CAL/GANG card.

<sup>34</sup> Special Order No. 3, Office of the Chief of Police. January 28, 2004

- **Meaningful statistics.** It would be useful if one aspect of gang crime statistics included crimes per thousand people. This can be a problem, since the neighborhoods most susceptible to gang activities are also the places where an accurate estimate of the population is most difficult to keep. Nonetheless, this measure is important because it offers a strong indicator of the effectiveness of police efforts – one significantly more accurate than simple counts of crimes reported or committed. Some measures are being developed to address this need, but they are not yet in general use. LASD should use the Performance Counts! initiative to establish meaningful outcome measurements for gang intervention and suppression.
- **Commitment to the CAL/GANG case management system.** Both LAPD and LASD recognize the need for better data, and both have begun to act. The departments have jointly adopted the CAL/GANG case management system. This promises to bring greater consistency and reliability to gang crime reporting, and holds the promise of more confident comparisons between LAPD and LASD. It even holds the possibility that LAPD and LASD might be able to offer consolidated reporting in areas of mutual concern. These efforts should be encouraged and expanded.
- **Commitment to a clearinghouse of gang intelligence.** In another effort, LAPD has joined the Los Angeles Regional Gang Information Network. Begun in August 2003, the Network is expected to begin operations in Summer 2004. It will serve as a regional clearinghouse for gang intelligence. If it works well, it will significantly multiply the effectiveness of gang crime responses throughout the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area. This effort, too, should be encouraged and supported.

**Recommendation 2: Law enforcement agencies should exploit best practices in data processing to support their management and analysis of gang suppression and intervention outcomes.**

It became evident during the course of this review that some law enforcement agencies are still using obsolete data processing systems to report and analyze crime data, including data on gang crimes. Continuing to use these systems long after they have been superseded in both power and economic efficiency is not a sound investment on behalf of the residents of Los Angeles County. All law enforcement agencies should move swiftly to identify more effective and efficient alternatives to existing systems. This may entail the acquisition of new data processing equipment and the retraining of existing staff to operate it; or it may involve contracting with other domestic providers of data processing services.

In addition to modernizing information technology equipment and staff, both LAPD and LASD should add to their staffs a small number of expert and experienced analysts who can help to frame insightful research questions and carry out sound research that will produce clear and useful conclusions. Such conclusions could form the basis for significant policy and program initiatives that could make



meaningful improvements in the performance of the governments of the City of Los Angeles and County of Los Angeles.

Such investments would be prudent uses of public funds, even in a time of economic stringency. The benefits of improved intelligence and more effective police work should more than offset the costs. Crime costs any city – including Los Angeles – literally billions of dollars a year in victims’ lost wages, court costs, jail costs and the loss of individuals who could otherwise act as legitimate, tax-paying citizens.

### **INTER-JURISDICTIONAL COLLABORATION**

**Recommendation 3: LAPD, LASD, City Attorney’s Office and County District Attorney’s Office should continue to expand the use of CGIs in their ongoing collaboration to suppress gang crime and intervene in gang activities.**

This expansion should include wider use of CGIs that extend across jurisdictional lines and multiple CGIs that address the activities of more than one gang in a single neighborhood.

CGIs offer powerful leverage against gang activities. If gang members are less able to gather in public, wear “colors,” and demonstrate their control of a neighborhood, they are less able to attract potential recruits. If they are prohibited from driving in neighborhoods dominated by rivals, they are less likely to shoot at others or be shot at themselves. If gang members cannot meet in parks or parking lots or on street corners, they cannot plan criminal enterprises with as much impunity as they would otherwise enjoy; and if they substitute telephone conversations for personal ones, they are vulnerable to legal electronic surveillance. The effects of these changes in the ways gang members can behave are both measurable and significant. Part 1 Crimes fall significantly once a CGI is implemented.

- **Example 1.** Traditionally, CGIs are sought for a single gang in a single neighborhood. Recently, however, the City and County have collaborated to obtain a CGI in an area of Los Angeles County and an adjoining neighborhood of the City of Los Angeles. In these areas, the City and County are working through the IGTF to initiate a joint effort across jurisdictional lines to reduce gang activities. This is a promising strategy, and it should be expanded wherever possible.
- **Example 2.** Another promising development is the recent granting of a CGI that includes 4 separate LAPD Divisions in 2 Bureaus (there are 18 Divisions in LAPD, organized into 4 Bureaus). This injunction is more directly aimed at the activities of a gang without consideration of the jurisdictional and bureaucratic boundaries it may cross. This is an approach that should be encouraged and expanded, with the intent that CGIs will be sought more on the basis of gang activity than on the organizational or civic boundaries that usually limit government activity.

Especially attractive would be combinations that would, in total, deny one or more gangs the opportunity to shift activities in response to increased law enforcement pressures. Other opportunities might be sought to identify areas where, if gang activities could be at least partially abated, private, non-profit or even commercial investment in a community might be possible. Finally, consideration should be given to the possibility of defining the public nuisance and obtaining injunctions that would address the activities of "mobile" gangs, in which members live in one neighborhood but commit crimes in another.

#### **STAFF ASSIGNMENTS**

**Recommendation 4: Deputy Probation Officers (DPOs) should be assigned to each LAPD Gang Impact Team and LASD Gang Investigation Unit.**

One of the most common advantages cited for both CLEAR and CGI's is the presence of dedicated Deputy Probation Officers (DPOs) who can support gang abatement activities. Both law enforcement officers and prosecutors repeatedly cited DPOs' presence as one of the highlights of the CLEAR effort. DPOs assigned to gang units would likely concentrate on juvenile probation, although they should work in areas which maximize their deterrent effect.

The advantages of involvement of Probation Officers are many:

- Probation Officers prepare sentencing recommendations for those convicted of crimes and, by virtue of this, have a significant influence on the sentences that are imposed.
- They also have extensive rights to question, investigate and, if necessary, detain probationers.
- DPOs acquire detailed knowledge of the community and its residents when they work on a team with law enforcement officers.
- They are better able to identify criminals and make appropriate recommendations.
- They are also much better equipped to make confident recommendations for lighter sentences where someone personally known to them as a potentially productive citizen becomes entangled with the law.

Probation is the most common punishment handed out for the first violation of the CGI terms. In addition, many youthful offenders, even those convicted of serious crimes, are placed on probation so that they will not be incarcerated in juvenile detention facilities – facilities that often do not educate, rehabilitate, or otherwise improve the job skills or attitude of their charges. Revocation of probation can be a serious matter, and the daily presence of a DPO in a neighborhood is a powerful incentive to probationers to abide by the terms of their release. The threat of revoked probation, carrying as it does the prospect of incarceration, appears to be a powerful deterrent to many late preteens and younger teenagers. A DPO can also obtain information from community residents that may not be easily available to a law enforcement officer. In contrast, law enforcement officers can provide DPOs

with escorts and local knowledge that allows them to be more effective than they would be alone, or with only occasional accompaniment by law enforcement officers.

For these reasons, the investment required to assign one DPO to each LAPD Division and to each LASD Substation with an active anti-gang program, seems a wise investment.

<b>Recommendation 5:</b>	<b>The City Attorney should assign one Deputy City Attorney to each LAPD Division Gang Impact Team to support the planning, development and enforcement of CGIs.</b>
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The City Attorney's Office currently assigns one or more Deputy City Attorneys (DCAs) to each LAPD Division. These DCAs provide legal support to the police on a wide variety of matters, including gang crime. In addition, when a Division seeks a CGI, members of the City Attorney's Gang Unit are assigned to the effort.

DCAs from the Gang Unit help to train officers in the collection of evidence needed to obtain an injunction, and work with them to develop sustainable cases against gang members. DCAs then oversee the preparation of the formal declarations of the officers, and ensure that they are thoroughly checked for accuracy. These declarations provide much of the legal support for the petition to the court for a CGI. DCAs also provide assistance in helping field forces stay current with best practices and current legal developments with respect to CGIs. According to many of those interviewed, DCAs assigned to CGI efforts frequently become integral parts of the enforcement team. Some of them continue to provide support even after their assignments - which are intended to be temporary - are concluded.

DCAs assigned to the CGI process are assigned to the Division only while the injunction is being sought. Absent supplementary funding, such as that found in CLEAR, the City Attorney's Office finds it difficult to detail DCAs to the divisional Gang Impact Teams on a permanent basis.

It appears that the assignment of a DCA to each LAPD Gang Impact Team that is contemplating, preparing or enforcing a CGI will:

- Expedite the preparation of the injunctions
- Help to ensure that they are sustained in court
- Provide effective assistance to the Gang Impact Teams in enforcing the injunctions once they are granted.

At a relatively low cost, these legal professionals will leverage existing efforts and encourage more active intervention against criminal gang behavior throughout the City of Los Angeles.

## **ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT**

**Recommendation 6: Once criminal behavior by gangs has been suppressed and intervention strategies are in place, the City and the County should marshal available resources to provide economic and community development in gang-impacted neighborhoods.**

The hard, sometimes dangerous work on the part of law enforcement officers and prosecutors can, for a time, sharply reduce the level of overt gang activity in a neighborhood. This effort, though demanding, has measurable results in Part 1 Crime reduction. The combination of CLEAR and CGIs appears to be highly effective in this regard. Unless there is strong support for community and economic development as a follow-on program, the laudable efforts undertaken to accomplish this reduction may well be in vain. Both the City and County must seize the opportunity the law enforcement community has won for them, and ensure constructive action is taken that can make permanent the benefits of civil order and the renewal of shared optimism. These kinds of efforts can sustain the gains that can be documented in the early years of CGI implementation.

A number of supportive efforts can be controlled by the City and County, and should be put in place in the immediate future where gang activities have been reduced. These include:

- Develop, in cooperation with existing community leadership organizations, strong, broadly based advisory groups that accurately and eloquently reflect the needs and aspirations of the community. This should include programs to support and protect community leaders and organizations willing to step forward and publicly oppose gangs and gang behavior, especially the tragic cycle of revenge killings.
- Implement an intensive graffiti removal program, aimed at removing or painting over all graffiti in the neighborhood within 24 hours
- Clear the neighborhood of abandoned vehicles, large pieces of refuse such as furniture and general street trash
- Conduct all scheduled building inspections and vigorously enforce code violations on commercial properties
- Replace damaged or broken street lights
- Repair streets, curbs and sidewalks
- Replace damaged or missing traffic and street signs
- Repaint curbs; restripe crosswalks and intersections
- Trim or replace street trees
- Assign dedicated teams to provide intensified efforts to deliver needed health and social services
- Review existing traffic patterns to determine whether traffic calming strategies or street diversions can be used to reduce cruising or even create "safety corridors" that would provide access to schools and other public services.

In addition, the City and County can and should work in partnership with other agencies to:

- Provide public transportation alternatives that offer access to centers of employment for the community
- Repair or replace, as needed, bus time tables, bus signs and bus stop furniture
- Carry out repairs and improve maintenance at local schools
- Seek funding for after-school programs and evening sporting events
- Modify school buildings and grounds to improve security, including added lighting, fencing, or other needed modifications

Finally, the City and County should forge partnerships with private non-profit and financial institutions to develop agreements that would:

- Enrich educational and recreational opportunities for children and teenagers, including the open discussion of the facts of gang life, the sales and use of illegal drugs and the tragic consequences of gang violence. Consideration should also be given to successful programs adopted elsewhere. (See Appendix A for examples of other programs.)
- Provide educational and job-seeking assistance to adults
- Earmark funds for investment in the community, including small business loans, home improvement loans and home ownership programs for renters
- In some neighborhoods, provide legitimate immigration counseling and legal representation.

A number of promising programs are in place in the City and County. Others have been recently initiated. They should be encouraged and expanded. Their results should be measured as carefully as possible, and those that show the most promise should be given the resources and organizational scope to operate on a larger scale.

Both the City and County face difficult financial choices, and the additional money for any of these initiatives would be gained only by painful reductions elsewhere. The list above may be incomplete, or that some of our recommendations may ultimately prove to be impractical, but they are offered as starting points.

Despite these difficulties, the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles might find it possible to truly raise the level of safety and the possibility of an improved way of life in one or more of its communities. Even if tax revenues increase only modestly, community improvement reduces feelings of futility on the part of the police, deputies, firefighters, probation officers, public health employees and the hundreds of others who now serve such neighborhoods without any reasonable hope of success. Those individuals, seeing that they may actually be able to make a difference, may find it difficult not to increase the pace and energy of their work. If more work is done, what remains is less intimidating. Slowly, with missteps and restarts and sometimes-painful discoveries, the quality of life in the City and the County improves; and slowly, just a bit at a time, administering the City and County become less expensive.

It is in these communities that prudent public investment can produce economic benefits for both residents and the government that claims to represent them. Even modest improvements in these desperate communities can produce

remarkable results. During the fact-finding, many brave businesspersons were interviewed. Merchants who moved businesses into difficult neighborhoods shortly after gang behavior was diminished – and at a time when it was not at all clear that the improvement would be more than an interlude. People were willing to buy dilapidated apartment buildings and repair them in hopes of gradually increasing rents. What was remarkable was the speed with which these small entrepreneurs – many not far removed from poverty themselves – were willing to venture into neighborhoods that were only recently the scenes of flagrant gang activity.

There is more good news for both the City and the County here. All of those small entrepreneurs pay taxes. Many of them will provide desperately needed entry-level jobs to neighborhood residents – residents who will also pay taxes and then patronize stores that pay yet more taxes in their turn. These desperate, blighted areas can, with good will and patient effort, find their way to a better, safer, more stable way of life.

## DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS

### DEFINITIONS

- **Gang.** A group of three or more persons who have a common identifying sign, symbol, or name, and whose members individually or collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal activity creating an atmosphere of fear and intimidation within the community. Any group, including outlaw motorcycle gangs, prison gangs, posses, taggers, party crews, subversive groups and their associated membership can qualify under the definition of a gang.
- **Gang member.** A juvenile or adult who has been positively identified and documented as a gang member under the California Department of Justice's approved criteria.
- **Affiliate gang member.** A juvenile or adult who is identified by a gang officer as one who associates with a gang, but is not necessarily a full member.
- **Gang officer.** Any officer or detective assigned to an authorized gang investigation unit, including, but not limited to, area Gang Impact Team (GIT) and Special Operations Support Division in LAPD or in the Safe Streets Bureau of LASD.
- **Gang-related crime.** Any crime may constitute a gang-related crime when the suspect or victim is an active or affiliate gang member, or when circumstances indicate that the crime is consistent with gang activity. Crime consistent with gang activity can include, but is not limited to, incidents when:
  - The suspect or victim has a gang tattoo
  - The suspect or victim has a gang moniker
  - A statement indicating gang involvement was made
  - The suspect or victim demonstrated gang behavior
  - Multiple suspects and gang *modus operandi* were involved.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Special Order No. 3, Office of the Chief of Police, LAPD, January 28, 2004.

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
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## **ACRONYMS**

ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
ADA	Assistant District Attorney
CBO	Community-based organization
CCR	Criminal Complaint Report
CGI	Civil Gang Injunction
CGNAC	California Gang Node Advisory Committee
CLEAR	Community Law Enforcement and Recovery
CYA	California Youth Authority
DCA	Deputy City Attorney
DDA	Deputy District Attorney
DPO	Deputy Probation Office
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
G-CAD	Gang Crime Analysis Detail
GED	Gang Enforcement Detail
GET	Gang Enforcement Team, LASD
GIT	Gang Impact Team, LAPD
GSS	Gang Support Section, Special Operations Support Division, LAPD
HEAT	Heightened Enforcement and Targeting
IGTF	Inter-Agency Gang Task Force
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
LASD	Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
MS	Mara Salvatrucha
NED	Narcotics Enforcement Detail
OSS	Operation Safe Street, LASD
RD	Reporting District (of LAPD)
SAGE	Strategies Against Gang Violence
SSB	Safe Streets Bureau, LASD
STEP	Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act
UCR	Uniform Crime Reporting (for the FBI)



## **APPENDIX A:**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW – DETAILS AND REFERENCES**

#### **CGIs AS WEAPONS AGAINST CRIMINAL GANG BEHAVIOR**

In a legal sense, CGIs are civil actions that prohibit specifically named individuals from engaging in particular activities within a clearly defined target area. It is usually a neighborhood-level intervention with a goal to rid the community of the actions that present a public nuisance, e.g., drug selling, prostitution, vandalism, etc.

It is not surprising that injunctions were developed in Los Angeles, where gang activity has historically been persistent and severe. According to Maxson *et. al.*, (2003a), in the early 1980s, law enforcement officers in Orange and Los Angeles Counties obtained a series of civil court injunctions to prohibit gang activity at specific locations in Santa Ana (1980), Pomona (1981), West Covina (1982) and East Los Angeles (1986). The Los Angeles City Attorney was the first to sue a gang as an unincorporated association in 1982. In 1987, a highly publicized injunction was issued against the Playboy Gangster Crips that, unlike others, covered the entire City of Los Angeles. The next injunction, issued in 1992, started a precedent of limiting the association of one defendant gang member with another. Injunction activity accelerated beginning in 1996 when a Southern California gang was enjoined, on average, every two months. Los Angeles County has two-thirds of the 31 injunctions issued in Southern California in the 1990s, while San Diego, Orange, San Bernardino and Ventura Counties issued the remaining one-third. In July 2003, the 17th injunction was implemented in Los Angeles County. While CGIs remain primarily a Southern California experience, the strategy has been used in Texas and other states as well (Maxson *et al.*, 2003b).

#### **THE PROCESS OF OBTAINING A CGI**

As an action in civil court, an injunction begins with a petition to the court for the relief from public nuisance caused by specific members of a gang. According to Maxson *et. al.*, (2003a), local prosecutors typically work with police to develop evidence to support a suit brought before a civil court judge. The evidence is a series of declarations by residents and law enforcement officers supported by criminal histories that name particular gang members, who have created and maintained a public nuisance. They are also used to document the fact that the gang is an unincorporated association responsible for such behaviors. It requires substantial effort on the part of prosecutors to obtain reports from residents fearful of retaliation, and usually takes several months to accomplish. This evidence becomes known to the gang members when the complaint is filed with the court. Each defendant is presented with a copy of the complaint to include them in the lawsuit. If they are not served with papers (i.e. they cannot be found), they may be excluded from the suit.

The suit alleges that a certain gang and its members present a public nuisance to its community in violation of Civil Code Sections 3479 and 3480. The petition asks that named members of the gang be prohibited, within a specified geographic area, from conducting a range of illegal activities, or legal activities which contribute to the gang activities constituting the nuisance. All named defendants are notified of the initial hearing date and served with a copy of the petition. One to three months after the petition is filed, there is a court hearing during which the judge may approve the issuance of the CGI as requested. If the judge finds the petition deficient (e.g., due to a vague description of activities sought to be proscribed or insufficient evidence), the proposed CGI may be modified to delete some defendants or in its terms. If the CGI is approved, a temporary restraining order is issued, and the defendants are served with notice that the preliminary injunction has been issued. If the defendants do not take the lawsuit to trial, the preliminary injunction becomes permanent; otherwise, the preliminary injunction remains in effect pending the outcome of the trial. CGI violations, whether the CGI is preliminary or permanent, subject the named individuals to arrest for violating a court order. The violators may be prosecuted criminally with penalties ranging from fines up to \$1,000 and/or incarceration for up to six months for a criminal prosecution. Civil enforcement of a CGI results in lesser penalties, including incarceration for up to 5 days, but the penalties may be imposed without the rigors of the criminal process.

#### **EXPECTED CGI BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS**

Maxson *et. al.* (2003a) (2003b) draw from the literature of criminology and social psychology three possible mechanisms through which injunctions might affect gang activity. The first, and most obvious, is deterrence, when gang members are threatened with punishment for the enjoined activities. The notifications of hearings and injunction papers may increase the perception by targeted gang members that they are being closely watched and are now more likely to be apprehended and prosecuted for violations (Klein, 1993). Vigorous policing and enforcement of an injunction are crucial to maintain this effect.

An additional effect of injunctions is a process of individualization that decreases identification with the gang (Zimbardo, 1969). Social psychological theory suggests that individuals may feel less responsible for their behavior when they strongly identify with a group (Erikson, 1968). As Maxson suggests, being served with injunction papers may send the message to the particular gang members that they are being closely watched, and increase their sense of personal responsibility for their own behavior. In this process, identification with the gang might decrease, as could the overall gang cohesiveness that is associated with violent gang activity (Klein, 1995).

Injunctions may also work through community empowerment, an idea derived from social disorganization theory (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993). Maxson hypothesizes that the process of developing and implementing a CGI may engage community members in an overall effort to build informal social control, social capital and supportive organizational structures in neighborhoods where gangs arise. By reducing the level of the immediate threat of the gang to community residents, injunctions may lay a foundation for shoring up community control that reduces

criminal activity. The Strategies Against Gang Environment (SAGE) manual of the Los Angeles County District Attorney, as well as other injunction practitioner literature, emphasizes the community policing perspective as the ideological foundation for a CGI. Former City Attorney James Hahn, who popularized CGIs in Los Angeles, believes that a CGI provides communities with the breathing space "to get those resources into the neighborhood, and once you get those established, gangs can't really come back and control everything" (*LA Weekly*, January 15, 1999). The goals of injunctions typically are couched in community policing terms, such as solving specific community crimes, decreasing disorder and overcoming fear (Greene, 2003). Higher levels of community involvement and greater impact on community environments might be expected from injunctions developed and implemented with this philosophical orientation, as compared with other forms of gang enforcement (Decker, 2003).

The expected benefits of CGIs can be summarized as follows:

- Residents are relieved from particular actions by gangs that were bothersome before (e.g., the public feels safer going to the local parks where the injunction prohibits gang from congregating)
- Residents gain a greater sense of control; they can anonymously report injunction violations to the police, gaining substantially more leverage in their attempts to control gang activities.
- Vigorous police enforcement provides an excuse for some members to get out of the gang.
- Youths are less exposed to gang activities when gangs stay off the streets.

At the same time, some scholars and community activists have expressed reservations about the widespread use of CGIs.

- In some cases, an injunction may serve as a common threat that helps to unite a gang and induce retaliation against individuals.
- Gang activities might be displaced to the neighboring areas not covered by the injunction when other factors do not prohibit this.
- Injunctions may not have any effect in the long run when gang members not named in the injunction become more active or when gangs learn how to get around injunctions, especially when enforcement is low.
- Injunctions can further alienate youths, labeling them forever as gang members and making it more difficult to return to normal life, especially since CGIs do not provide positive alternatives.
- The suppression of a local gang may attract rival, neighboring gangs.
- The injunction limits the civil rights of an individual. The ACLU has challenged CGIs on those grounds, causing some injunctions to be denied or reversed.
- A CGI requires substantial investment in resources 1) at the injunction preparation stage, when evidence is collected and documents are presented and 2) in enforcement, which entails increased policing and injunction-related arrests. These expenses could be spent on alternative prevention programs.

Maxson undertook a survey of gang officials in the jurisdictions of Southern California that issued 30 injunctions. Survey respondents typically described an impetus for an injunction as an intolerable level of violent criminal and nuisance

behavior concentrated in a particular area that was claimed by the enjoined gang. Injunctions are usually regarded as a last resort, when more common measures are exhausted. Law enforcement, the City Attorney, or the District Attorney take the lead in deciding to pursue an injunction. The survey revealed that two-thirds of the respondents did not feel that community support is crucial. Approximately one-half of the respondents suggested that the community played no role in the development of injunctions.

While a CGI might be obtained with little or no community involvement, such involvement might be crucial for the long-term success of a CGI. The injunction obtained in the City of Inglewood, where the community commitment was especially weak, has not been successful (Maxson and Allen, 1997).

Sometimes, injunctions depart from the established trend to target neighborhood-based gangs and are used to prevent fledgling gangs from becoming entrenched in the neighborhood, such as in San Bernardino in 1999, or to secure certain neighborhood events (e.g., the county fair in Ventura in 1998) (Maxson, 2003a). Although most injunctions rely solely on deterrence, communities – such as Redondo Beach – supplemented their CGI with skill training programs and employment opportunities for gang members.

The proscribed activities vary because the nature of the nuisance is specific to a particular community. Gang members are typically prohibited from congregating in or near certain locations (e.g., parks and schools), committing vandalism, harassing or intimidating residents, trespassing on private property or engaging in behaviors commonly associated with selling drugs (e.g., possessing pagers or acting as a lookout). Other prohibited activities may include using a cell-phone, riding a bike, whistling, using abusive language or violating a curfew.

There is no systematic recording of the number of arrests in gang injunctions, but findings from interviews conducted by Maxson et al (2003) suggest that relatively few arrests and prosecutions typically result from injunctions. Newspapers report that often police prefer not to arrest for injunction violations, but use them as a negotiation tool to extract information from the gang members (Press-Telegram).

### **EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF CGI SUCCESS**

The law enforcement agencies responsible for implementing CGIs perceive it as a successful intervention, as is typical of practitioners' assessment of their own programs. Maxson *et. al.* present some anecdotal evidence they collected through their interviews. Success is reported in multiple dimensions:

- Reduction in gang activity
- The splintering of gang structures resulting from relocation of targeted gang members
- Decreases in crime rates
- Increase in residents' sense of security.

The Redondo Beach and San Bernardino injunctions are perceived to be particularly successful, reporting up to 90% reduction in reported crime. Newspaper articles

and practitioners' literature also laud the success of the injunctions (e.g., Cameron et al. 1997).

The observations of outside observers are not always as uniformly positive. An article in the Long Beach Press-Telegram,<sup>36</sup> focusing on CGIs in Long Beach, contained the following conclusions:

- ❑ One injunction was followed by reduction in crime rates, the other by an increase.
- ❑ Other gang-related programs were launched at the same time as the injunctions, making it difficult to attribute the changes in gang activity to the injunctions alone.
- ❑ Nearly 80% of the gang members named in the injunctions were convicted of at least one crime after the injunctions were imposed.
- ❑ Out of 20 people named in the East Side Longos Injunction (2001), 4 were convicted of violating the injunction in the year-and-a-half after the injunction was implemented.

Unfortunately, CGI efforts suffer from a lack of systematic evaluation. The most scientifically rigorous study was conducted by Grogger (2000), using data from 14 injunctions imposed in Los Angeles County between 1993 and 1998. He established a control group of 14 areas that he compared to 14 areas in which injunctions were imposed. He then contrasted crime rates in the control and CGI areas. Grogger used two alternative methods to pick the comparison areas for each injunction 1) areas neighboring (but not bordering) the injunction area and 2) areas with a matching pre-injunction crime level. The same technique was used to detect spillover or displacement effects of the injunction on the bordering areas. The data he used allowed for comparison of crime trends in the five quarters preceding the injunctions with the crimes in the following year.

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**From his analysis, Grogger concluded that reported violent crimes fell on average between 5 to 10 percent compared with the pre-injunction period.** The largest crime reductions were concentrated in assault, while the effect on the reduction in robberies was less pronounced. His analysis revealed that neither murders nor rapes were affected by injunctions. Finally, this study uncovered no evidence of the displacement of criminal activity into adjoining areas due to an injunction.

This study has a number of limitations in interpreting the effectiveness of injunctions. Due to limited data availability, the study measures only the effects of injunctions on murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault, while other gang-related problems for which injunctions are believed to be the most effective (e.g., drug-related crimes, residents' sense of safety) are not measured. Also, the study method measures the average effect of the injunctions, regardless of its characteristics (a small number of injunctions do not allow one to measure the effects of specific characteristics). Thus, there may be some injunctions that were much more successful than the mean, and some that were ineffective or even harmful (e.g., the Inglewood injunction, widely perceived as ineffective, was

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<sup>36</sup> <http://www.presstelegram.com/Stories/0,1413,204~29997~1770117,00.html>

included in the analysis). Also, the study only reports short-term effects of an injunction, while longer-term outcomes remain unclear.

The effect of injunctions may be overestimated in the study if police patrols and aggressive law enforcement investigations are reduced before an injunction is implemented. The speculative cause of this reduction is the need to assign police officers to the substantial task of collecting evidence and preparing for the injunction. It is also possible that an injunction is part of a wider strategy involving other programs, which were launched together. In such cases, one cannot attribute the entire crime reduction effect to any one initiative.

The effects of injunctions cannot be judged unless compared to other programs. Some anti-gang interventions are similar to injunctions, including common elements such as community policing, Inter-agency cooperation and place-based enforcement efforts. Grogger (2000) also presented information on other comparable programs in his study. He does not compare injunctions with community policing programs because they have not been evaluated rigorously.

- The best-known example of interventions relying on Inter-agency cooperation is the Boston Gun Project. It first used intelligence from several law enforcement agencies to identify chronically offending gang members. The gang members were told that the police would respond swiftly to future reports of gun violence and that the penalties for such violence would effectively increase. The project has been credited with a nearly 60 percent reduction in youth homicides, even though the question remains of other factors contributing to this outcome.
- Place-based enforcement interventions typically involve direct patrols by police, which, like the gang injunctions, focus on small geographic areas with particularly acute crime problems. One such program in Kansas City that deployed special police patrols and focused on seizing illegal guns within an 8-by-10-block neighborhood was estimated to reduce gun crimes in the target area by nearly 50 percent over a 6-month period.
- Another program in Minneapolis increased patrols within a randomly selected group of 55 crime "hot spots." As a result, the number of calls to police regarding "hard crimes" decreased by about 5 percent, and disorder witnessed by trained observers decreased by 25 percent.
- A Jersey City experiment, which also included small target areas that were randomly assigned to intervention, reduced reported crime by 32 percent and calls to police by 14 percent.

In comparison with these other place-based enforcement efforts, the effects of the gang injunctions are relatively small. This may be the result of differences in patrolling efforts, because in all of the place-based interventions cited, the evaluators document a substantial increase in police presence within the targeted areas. Although there are no data on injunction-related patrols, the smaller effects of the injunctions are consistent with anecdotal evidence from prosecutors that, in many cases, police patrols changed little in response to the injunctions. The



effectiveness information alone is not enough to prefer one intervention against another; it is also important to know the costs of the interventions, which are unknown at present.

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**COUNTY AND CITY OF LOS ANGELES**  
**A MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF**  
**CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS (CGIS)**

**APPENDIX B**  
**SUPPLEMENTAL DATA ANALYSIS OF**  
**TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES, BY CGI,**  
**AND CGI MAPS**  
**FOR THE**  
**2003-2004 LOS ANGELES COUNTY**  
**CIVIL GRAND JURY**

**SUPPLEMENTAL DATA ANALYSIS OF  
TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES, BY CGI,  
AND CGI MAPS**

**FOR THE**

**2003-2004 LOS ANGELES COUNTY  
CIVIL GRAND JURY**

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THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

## 1. Bounty Hunters


THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
 FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

1. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Bounty Hunters

Areas	Total Crimes		Difference
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 Quarters)	
Target	147.50	100.17	-47.33
Adjacent	101.47	86.30	-15.17
Neighboring	120.38	107.95	-12.42
			3.37
			Difference-in-difference
Target			-34.91
Adjacent			22.57
			-2.74
			5.01
Areas	Part 1 Crimes		Difference
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 Quarters)	
Target	96.89	63.33	-33.56
Adjacent	65.27	56.30	-8.97
Neighboring	76.33	69.55	-6.79
			2.52
			Difference-in-difference
Target			-26.77
Adjacent			17.45
			-2.18
			3.88


\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period

**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**



**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**

*Down to 1000 feet*



**Safety Zone Map**

Office of the City Attorney and  
Office of the District Attorney  
City of Los Angeles

ENGINEERING  
QUARTER ENGINEERING, P.C.  
CITY ENGINEER





THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

## 2. Rolling 60s


THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
 FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

2. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Rolling 60s

Areas	Total Crimes		Difference
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 Quarters)	
Target	123.94	110.22	-13.72
Adjacent	134.83	112.70	5.07
Neighboring	112.46	98.86	-22.13
			6.72
			-13.61
			3.91
			Difference-in-difference
Target			-0.12
Adjacent			6.40
			-8.53
			7.77
Areas	Part 1 Crimes		Difference
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 Quarters)	
Target	74.35	69.89	-4.46
Adjacent	83.03	70.30	3.47
Neighboring	67.45	60.39	-12.73
			3.36
			-7.06
			2.40
			Difference-in-difference
Target			2.60
Adjacent			4.22
			-5.67
			4.13

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period


**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**



Scale 1 : 75,000  
1" = 1.18 mi  
Data Zoom 11-4

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**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**



**LA CITY ENGINEERING**  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES  
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CITY ENGINEER  
City of Los Angeles  
Department of Public Works  
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Los Angeles, CA 90012

**Rolling 60's Safety Zone**  
Office of the City Attorney  
City of Los Angeles



THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

### 3. Avenues

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
 FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

3. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Avenues

Areas	Total Crimes							
	Pre-injunction*		Post Injunction (2 Quarters)		Post Injunction (4 Quarters)		Post Injunction (6 Quarters)	
	Total Crimes	Difference	Total Crimes	Difference	Total Crimes	Difference	Total Crimes	Difference
Target	82.61	-4.63	77.98	-4.12	78.49	-4.12	75.90	-6.70
Adjacent	30.83	2.83	29.00	1.83	29.25	1.73	28.56	2.34
Neighboring	37.12	1.58	38.25	1.13	38.25	1.13	36.48	-2.28
		2.36		1.53				1.79
		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference
Target		-5.76		-5.49		-5.49		-6.99
Adjacent		3.68		2.71		2.71		2.76
		-2.96		-2.96		-2.96		-2.57
		2.84		2.31		2.31		2.32

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period


THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
 FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

3. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Avenues

Areas	Part 1 Crimes							
	Pre-injunction *		Post Injunction (2 Quarters)		Post Injunction (4 Quarters)		Post Injunction (6 Quarters)	
	Part 1 Crimes	Difference	Part 1 Crimes	Difference	Part 1 Crimes	Difference	Part 1 Crimes	Difference
Target	46.70	-4.74	41.96	-4.74	43.76	-2.94	42.79	-3.91
Adjacent	19.20	2.33	17.21	-1.99	18.34	-0.86	17.97	-1.23
Neighboring	22.83	1.47	23.83	1.00	24.21	1.38	23.12	0.29
				1.52		0.82		0.74
				Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference
Target		-5.74		-5.74		-4.32		-4.20
Adjacent		2.78		2.78		1.98		2.08
		-2.99		-2.99		-2.24		-1.52
		2.11		2.11		1.52		1.49


\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period

**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**





**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
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**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**

## **4. KAM**

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
 FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

4. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: KAM

Areas	Total Crimes							
	Pre-injunction*		Post Injunction (2 Quarters)		Post Injunction (4 Quarters)		Post Injunction (6 Quarters)	
	Total Crimes	Difference	Total Crimes	Difference	Total Crimes	Difference	Total Crimes	Difference
Target	71.56	-7.89	63.67	-7.97	63.58	-7.22	64.33	-7.22
		3.55		5.19		4.35		4.35
Adjacent	74.65	-0.58	74.06	-0.86	73.78	-4.15	70.50	-4.15
		5.61		3.81		3.78		3.78
Neighboring	55.14	-0.54	54.61	0.98	56.13	-1.31	53.83	-1.31
		2.98		2.41		1.97		1.97
		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference
Target		-7.35		-9.14		-6.95		-6.95
		4.64		5.72		4.78		4.78
Adjacent		-0.05		-2.03		-3.87		-3.87
		6.35		4.51		4.26		4.26

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.


THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
 FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

4. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: KAM


Areas	Part 1 Crimes							
	Pre-injunction		Post Injunction (2 Quarters)		Post Injunction (4 Quarters)		Post Injunction (6 Quarters)	
	Part 1 Crimes	Difference	Part 1 Crimes	Difference	Part 1 Crimes	Difference	Part 1 Crimes	Difference
Target	45.28	-5.44	39.83	-6.44	38.83	-6.44	39.72	-5.56
Adjacent	47.98	4.48	48.63	0.65	46.78	-1.20	44.75	-3.23
Neighboring	35.40	5.26	36.68	1.27	36.57	1.17	35.13	-0.27
		2.48		2.10		2.10		1.89
		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference
Target		-6.72		-7.61		-7.61		-5.28
Adjacent		5.12		4.24		4.24		3.57
		-0.63		-2.36		-2.36		-2.96
		5.82		4.0		4.0		4.09

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.

**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
 FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**



**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**



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THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

## 5. 18<sup>th</sup> Street Pico Union

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
 FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

5. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: 18<sup>th</sup> Street Pico Union

Areas	Total Crimes							
	Pre-injunction		Post Injunction (2 Quarters)		Post Injunction (4 Quarters)		Post Injunction (6 Quarters)	
	Total Crimes	Difference	Total Crimes	Difference	Total Crimes	Difference	Total Crimes	Difference
Target	73.89	-10.31	63.58	-11.85	62.04	-11.85	60.86	-13.03
Adjacent	61.13	6.55	53.27	7.24	53.85	7.24	52.12	7.99
Neighboring	110.29	-7.86	96.77	-7.28	101.08	-7.28	99.77	-9.01
		3.70		3.22		3.22		3.26
		-13.53		-9.22		-9.22		-10.53
		5.34		4.66		4.66		5.29
		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference
Target		3.22		-3.38		-3.38		-4.93
Adjacent		8.46		8.61		8.61		9.58
		5.67		1.19		1.19		-0.91
		6.50		5.66		5.66		6.22

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.




THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS --  
 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
 FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

5. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: 18<sup>th</sup> Street Pico Union

Areas	Part 1 Crimes							
	Pre-Injunction*		Post Injunction (2 Quarters)		Post Injunction (4 Quarters)		Post Injunction (6 Quarters)	
	Part 1 Crimes	Difference	Part 1 Crimes	Difference	Part 1 Crimes	Difference	Part 1 Crimes	Difference
Target	50.64	-8.47	42.17	4.66	40.83	-9.81	40.56	-10.08
Adjacent	41.69	-5.85	35.85	2.13	35.31	-6.38	34.23	-7.46
Neighboring	74.14	-12.60	61.54	3.96	65.67	-8.47	66.04	-8.10
		Difference-in-difference				Difference-in-difference		Difference-in-difference
Target		4.13				-1.34		-1.98
Adjacent		6.12				6.80		7.71
		6.76				2.08		0.64
		4.49				4.15		4.86

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.

**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**



**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**



**Pico-Union Target Area**  
Office of the City Attorney  
City of Los Angeles

**ENGINEERING**  
VITAL E. TEOJANA, P.E.  
REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER  
No. 10456  
CITY OF LOS ANGELES  
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LOS ANGELES, CA 90007  
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THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

## 6. Canoga Park Alabama

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS --  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

6. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Canoga Park Alabama

Reporting Districts	Total Crimes											
	Pre-injunction *		Post Injunction (2 Quarters)		Post Injunction (4 Quarters)		Post Injunction (6 Quarters)		Post Injunction (8 Quarters)		Post Injunction (10 Quarters)	
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference	Quarterly Mean	Difference	Quarterly Mean	Difference	Quarterly Mean	Difference	Quarterly Mean	Difference
Target	82.99	83.53	88.90	0.54	88.35	5.91	88.35	5.36	84.72	1.73	82.91	-0.08
Adjacent	72.92	71.06	70.19	-1.85	70.19	-2.73	70.19	-2.73	70.67	-2.24	69.50	-3.42
Neighboring	61.65	65.90	68.90	4.25	66.77	7.25	66.77	5.12	64.72	3.07	63.37	1.72
				2.60		2.55		1.99		1.80		1.68
				Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target				-3.71		3.44		3.40		0.73		-0.25
Adjacent				3.38		3.51		2.75		2.55		2.46
				-6.10		-5.20		-4.69		-3.24		-3.59
				4.42		3.84		3.92		3.95		4.21

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES


6. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Canoga Park Alabama

Reporting Districts	Part 1 Crimes												
	Pre-injunction*		Post Injunction (2 Quarters)		Post Injunction (4 Quarters)		Post Injunction (6 Quarters)		Post Injunction (8 Quarters)		Post Injunction (10 Quarters)		
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference	Quarterly Mean	Difference	Quarterly Mean	Difference	Quarterly Mean	Difference	Quarterly Mean	Difference	Quarterly Mean	Difference
Target	51.02	47.56	-3.46	53.43	2.41	53.50	2.48	51.36	0.34	50.39	-0.63		
Adjacent	45.15	40.38	-4.77	42.41	1.31	42.69	1.27	43.55	-1.60	42.75	1.25		
Neighboring	37.58	37.18	-0.41	40.05	1.96	39.54	2.02	38.58	1.00	37.76	0.17		
			1.87		1.56		1.24		1.13		1.07		
			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target			-3.05		-0.06		0.52		-0.66		-0.81		
Adjacent			2.20		2.03		1.77		1.68		1.65		
			-4.36		-5.21		-4.42		-2.60		-2.57		
			2.82		2.50		2.37		2.42		2.35		

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.




**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**



**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**

Prepared by: Dept. of Public Works, Bureau of Engineering, GIS Mapping



**Canoga Park Safety Zone**  
Office of the City Attorney  
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THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
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## 7. Pacoima Project Boys

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

7. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Pacoima Project Boys

Reporting Districts	Total Crimes													
	Pre-injunction*		Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)	
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Standard Error	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	78.83	97.00	18.17	99.88	21.04	94.50	15.67	91.44	12.60	88.80	9.97	87.41	8.58	
			12.08		4.67		2.39		3.29		1.08		1.37	
Adjacent	76.33	83.36	7.02	85.29	8.95	82.33	6.00	82.16	5.83	82.51	6.18	80.97	4.64	
			2.87		4.30		2.48		2.07		1.92		1.89	
Neighboring	54.03	59.90	5.87	60.73	6.69	59.75	5.72	59.85	5.82	60.25	6.22	59.83	5.79	
			3.81		3.62		3.74		3.76		4.10		4.08	
			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences	
Target			12.30		16.07		11.52		8.53		5.36		2.78	
			12.66		5.91		4.43		5.00		4.24		4.31	
Adjacent			1.16		3.98		1.85		1.75		1.57		-1.15	
			4.76		5.63		4.48		4.30		4.53		4.50	

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.


THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

7. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Pacoima Project Boys

Reporting Districts	Pre-injunction*	Part 1 Crimes											
		Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)	
		Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	44.00	10.50	54.13	10.13	52.58	8.58	51.50	7.50	50.25	6.25	49.32	5.32	
		1.55		1.93		2.98		1.91		3.71		3.46	
Adjacent	44.71	3.07	47.07	2.36	45.45	0.74	45.93	1.21	46.44	1.73	45.84	1.13	
		2.10		1.50		0.98		0.66		0.72		0.77	
Neighboring	32.60	5.90	37.58	4.98	36.75	4.15	36.68	4.08	37.21	4.61	36.75	4.15	
		2.72		2.48		2.45		2.42		2.79		2.76	
Target		4.60		5.15		4.43		3.43		1.64		1.17	
		3.13		3.14		3.86		3.08		4.64		4.43	
Adjacent		-2.83		-2.62		-3.41		-2.86		-2.88		-3.02	
		3.44		2.90		2.64		2.51		2.88		2.86	

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.

**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**



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**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
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FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**

*10/20/14*

Prepared by Dept. of Public Works, Bureau of Engineering, C.I.S. Mapping Division (06/08/08)



*Pasadena Project Boys*

**Foothill Safety Zone**

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THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
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## 8. Culver City Boys

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

8. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Culver City Boys

Reporting Districts	Total Crimes											
	Pre-injunction* Quarterly Mean	Post Injunction (2 quarters) Quarterly Mean	Post Injunction (4 quarters) Quarterly Mean	Post Injunction (6 quarters) Quarterly Mean	Post Injunction (8 quarters) Quarterly Mean	Post Injunction (10 quarters) Quarterly Mean	Post Injunction (12 quarters) Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Difference (Standard Error)	Difference (Standard Error)	Difference (Standard Error)	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	48.26	42.00	40.96	43.05	42.61	41.94	40.98	-6.26	-5.21	-5.65	-6.32	-7.29
								1.93	1.10	1.58	1.45	1.67
Adjacent	40.79	37.07	38.79	39.36	39.14	39.03	38.62	-3.71	-1.43	-1.64	-1.76	-2.17
								1.80	2.56	2.60	2.51	2.32
Neighboring	41.24	36.83	35.92	35.72	36.63	37.14	36.66	-4.40	-5.51	-4.61	-4.09	-4.58
								2.52	1.64	1.42	1.24	1.33
								Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences
Target								-1.86	2.13	0.85	-0.36	-2.71
								3.18	1.97	2.12	1.91	2.13
Adjacent								0.69	5.92	4.86	4.21	2.41
								3.10	3.04	2.96	2.80	2.67

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES


8. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Culver City Boys

Reporting Districts	Part 1 Crimes													
	Pre-injunction* Quarterly Mean	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)		
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	28.50	22.43	-6.07	21.36	22.55	-5.95	22.66	22.56	-5.84	22.56	21.95	-5.94	21.95	-6.55
			1.29			0.91			0.74			0.99		1.22
Adjacent	26.64	22.43	-4.21	24.57	25.19	-1.45	24.57	23.91	-2.07	23.91	23.77	-2.73	23.77	-2.87
			1.75			2.11			2.05			1.96		1.77
Neighboring	28.81	22.25	-6.56	21.98	21.46	-7.35	22.30	22.84	-6.50	22.84	22.66	-5.96	22.66	-6.15
			2.00			1.64			1.46			1.35		1.42
			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target			0.48			1.39			0.66			0.02		-0.40
			2.38			1.88			1.64			1.68		1.87
Adjacent			2.34			5.89			4.43			3.24		3.28
			2.66			2.67			2.51			2.38		2.27

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.




**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
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Prepared by Oshin of Public Works, Bureau of Engineering, C.I.S. Mapping Division 6/6/2005



*Culver City Boys*

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THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
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## 9. Venice 13

**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**

**9. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Venice 13**

Reporting Districts	Total Crimes												
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)	
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	74.69	74.94	0.26	73.36	-1.32	70.15	-4.54	70.75	-3.94	72.39	-2.30	72.22	-2.46
			4.40		3.89		3.22		2.85		2.78		2.56
Adjacent	42.86	41.58	-1.28	43.79	0.93	45.69	2.83	46.35	3.49	46.13	3.27	46.58	3.72
			2.53		2.04		1.98		2.18		2.60		2.38
Neighboring	35.79	39.25	3.46	38.88	3.08	36.54	0.75	37.00	1.21	37.65	1.86	38.27	2.48
			3.96		2.70		1.62		2.11		2.38		2.29
			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target			-3.20		-1.30		-3.83		-3.48		-2.14		-4.94
			5.92		4.73		3.60		3.54		3.66		3.43
Adjacent			-4.74		0.95		3.54		3.95		3.43		1.24
			4.70		3.38		2.56		3.04		3.52		3.31

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.


THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

9. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Venice 13

Reporting Districts	Part 1 Crimes													
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)		
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	44.44	47.67	3.22 2.51	46.56	44.00	-0.44 1.74	44.42	45.26	-0.03 1.59	45.26	45.32	0.81 1.74	45.32	0.88 1.62
Adjacent	27.58	24.92	-2.67 2.07	26.13	27.58	0.00 0.73	28.63	28.45	1.04 0.98	28.45	28.54	0.87 1.18	28.54	0.96 0.99
Neighboring	22.58	22.38	-0.21 1.38	22.56	21.88	-0.71 1.77	22.13	22.43	-0.46 1.14	22.43	23.29	-0.16 1.30	23.29	0.71 1.33
			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target			3.43 2.86			0.26 2.48			0.43 1.95			0.97 2.17		0.17 2.10
Adjacent			-2.46 2.49			0.71 1.91			1.50 1.50			1.03 1.76		0.25 1.66

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.

**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
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THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
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FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

## 10. Harbor City Boys and Harbor City Crips



THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

10. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Harbor City Boys and Harbor City Crips

Reporting Districts	Total Crimes												
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)	
		Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean
Target	94.78	100.50	5.72	104.25	9.47	107.22	12.44	107.25	12.47	110.60	15.82	108.83	14.06
Adjacent	35.44	36.00	0.56	40.00	4.56	39.72	4.28	40.71	5.26	40.63	5.19	40.19	4.75
Neighboring	72.69	80.06	7.38	78.06	5.38	77.31	4.63	77.45	4.77	77.65	4.96	77.92	5.23
			3.86		4.20		3.21		3.28		2.62		2.22
			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target			-1.65		5.26		10.13		9.80		13.58		8.83
Adjacent			5.09		7.39		5.37		5.65		6.25		6.24
			-6.82		0.35		1.97		2.59		2.94		-0.48
			5.05		6.68		5.12		5.27		4.84		4.44

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.


**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
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**10. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Harbor City Boys and Harbor City Crips**


Reporting Districts	Pre-Injunction* Quarterly Mean	Part 1 Crimes											
		Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-Injunction (10 quarters)		Post-Injunction (12 quarters)	
		Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	57.56	60.33	2.78	62.58	5.03	64.78	7.22	64.50	6.94	67.83	10.28	67.31	9.75
Adjacent	23.94	23.83	-0.11	26.75	2.81	27.28	3.33	28.25	4.31	28.03	4.09	27.39	3.44
Neighboring	46.10	52.00	5.90	50.31	4.21	48.42	2.31	48.78	2.68	48.35	2.25	48.50	2.40
			3.12		3.81		2.61		2.37		2.00		1.73
			Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences
Target			-3.12	0.82	0.82	4.91	4.27	4.27	4.27	8.03	8.03	7.35	7.35
Adjacent			5.90	7.58	7.58	5.41	4.64	4.64	4.64	4.78	4.78	4.86	4.86
			-6.01	-1.40	-1.40	1.02	1.63	1.63	1.63	1.84	1.84	1.05	1.05
			4.48	5.79	5.79	4.80	5.04	5.04	5.04	4.64	4.64	4.00	4.00


\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.

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**Harbor City Boys**  
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THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
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## 11. Venice Shoreline Crips

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

11. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Venice Shoreline Crips

Reporting Districts	Total Crimes													
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)		
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	93.53	81.10	-12.43 8.11	84.10	83.77	-9.43 8.75	81.25	81.18	-12.28 8.12	81.18	82.22	-12.35 7.72	82.22	-11.32 7.87
Adjacent	50.25	42.00	-8.25 3.19	41.00	41.75	-9.25 2.65	44.31	45.05	-5.94 1.42	45.05	44.21	-5.20 2.17	44.21	-6.04 2.41
Neighboring	28.58	28.00	-0.58 0.26	26.63	27.08	-1.96 0.90	26.06	25.30	-2.52 0.06	25.30	25.88	-3.28 0.76	25.88	-2.71 0.13
			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target			-11.85 8.11			-6.18 8.22			-10.03 8.12			-9.60 7.76		-8.61 7.88
Adjacent			-7.67 3.20			-6.42 2.80			-3.69 1.42			-2.45 2.30		-3.33 2.41

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.

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
11. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Venice Shoreline Crips

Reporting Districts	Part 1 Crimes														
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)			
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	55.63	49.00	-6.63	52.80	52.90	-2.73	50.63	50.64	-5.01	50.64	51.50	-4.99	51.50	51.50	-4.13
			5.89			5.71			5.38			5.04			5.32
Adjacent	31.17	21.25	-9.92	22.38	23.83	-7.33	25.94	26.50	-5.23	26.50	26.17	-4.67	26.17	26.17	-5.00
			4.23			2.90			2.82			3.08			2.54
Neighboring	17.75	14.25	-3.50	14.50	15.67	-2.08	15.50	15.00	-2.25	15.00	15.25	-2.75	15.25	15.25	-2.50
			2.42			0.77			0.85			1.20			0.51
			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences
Target			-3.13			-0.65			-2.76			-2.24			-1.63
			6.36			5.76			5.45			5.18			5.35
Adjacent			-6.42			-5.25			-2.98			-1.92			-2.50
			4.87			3.00			2.95			3.31			2.59

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.




**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**





**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**

Prepared by: Dept. of Public Works, Bureau of Engineering, C.I.S. Mapping Division (04/20/21)



*Venice Shoreline Crisps*

**The Oakwood Area**  
Office of the City Attorney  
City of Los Angeles

**ENGINEERING**  
VIVIAN E. TROYAN, P.E.  
CITY ATTORNEY

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

## 12. Langdon Street

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

12. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Langdon Street

Reporting Districts	Total Crimes													
	Pre-injunction *	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)		
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	108.67	106.75	-1.92	95.63	107.25	-13.04	104.81	107.05	-1.42	104.81	107.05	-3.85	107.42	-1.62
			0.78			1.41			3.83			1.08		2.59
Adjacent	45.69	49.57	3.88	47.86	50.45	2.17	50.38	51.57	4.76	50.38	51.57	4.68	52.57	5.88
			2.89			2.42			2.06			2.23		2.50
Neighboring	51.80	64.58	12.78	64.69	66.18	12.88	67.41	69.06	14.38	67.41	69.06	15.60	70.03	17.26
			19.22			18.31			18.78			19.32		19.90
			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target			-14.70			-21.48			-10.57			-13.54		-11.86
			19.23			18.37			19.17			19.35		20.07
Adjacent			-8.90			-6.27			-4.39			-5.00		-4.36
			19.43			18.47			18.89			19.44		20.06

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.


THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
 FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

12. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Langdon Street

Reporting Districts	Pre-injunction* Quarterly Mean	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)	
		Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	64.08	54.00	-10.08	49.88	-14.21	58.33	-5.75	57.63	-6.46	58.55	-5.53	59.79	-4.29
Adjacent	26.55	28.29	1.74	28.18	1.63	29.67	3.12	29.46	2.92	30.20	3.65	31.01	4.46
Neighboring	32.96	40.92	7.96	41.40	8.44	42.11	9.15	42.65	9.69	43.20	10.24	43.71	10.75
			11.97		11.86		12.11		12.55		12.78		12.72
			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target			-18.04		-22.65		-14.90		-16.15		-15.78		-15.04
Adjacent			12.81		12.33		12.17		12.56		12.79		12.74
			-6.22		-6.81		-6.03		-6.77		-6.59		-6.29
			12.08		11.97		12.22		12.69		12.95		13.04


\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.

**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**



**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**

Prepared by Dept. of Public Works, Bureau of Engineering, GIS Mapping Division 900301



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THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

## 13. Harpys



THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

13. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Harpys

Reporting Districts	Total Crimes											
	Pre-injunction* Quarterly Mean	Post Injunction (2 quarters) Quarterly Mean	Post Injunction (4 quarters) Quarterly Mean	Post Injunction (6 quarters) Quarterly Mean	Post Injunction (8 quarters) Quarterly Mean	Post-injunction (10 quarters) Quarterly Mean	Post-injunction (12 quarters) Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Difference (Standard Error)	Difference (Standard Error)	Difference (Standard Error)	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	58.97	53.00	53.10	54.03	54.68	54.80	57.83	-5.87	-4.94	-4.30	-4.17	-1.15
								1.97	1.44	1.24	1.43	1.38
Adjacent	72.25	69.11	69.04	69.42	70.85	71.16	72.23	-3.21	-2.83	-1.40	-1.09	-0.02
								4.79	1.78	1.42	1.31	1.44
Neighboring	76.02	71.48	72.74	72.73	73.79	75.40	75.91	-4.55	-3.29	-2.23	-0.62	-0.11
								1.94	2.13	2.18	2.18	2.23
								Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences	Difference-in-Differences
Target								-1.42	-0.06	0.01	-1.42	-1.03
								3.38	2.57	2.50	2.60	2.62
Adjacent								1.40	2.05	2.90	1.67	0.09
								5.17	2.77	2.60	2.54	2.65

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.




**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS –  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES**

**13. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Harpys**

Reporting Districts	Part 1 Crimes													
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)		
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	42.04	35.75	-6.29	37.04	37.54	-4.50	38.11	38.11	38.11	38.11	-3.93	40.75	40.75	-1.29
			1.90			1.08					0.99			1.13
Adjacent	54.27	47.32	-6.95	49.29	49.88	-4.39	50.38	50.38	50.38	50.98	-3.90	51.80	51.80	-2.48
			2.95			1.16					0.88			0.98
Neighboring	54.13	50.62	-3.51	49.68	49.25	-4.88	49.82	49.82	49.82	51.37	-4.31	51.39	51.39	-2.73
			1.23			1.36					1.44			1.61
			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences					Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences
Target			-2.78			0.38					0.38			-1.18
			2.27			1.74					1.74			1.77
Adjacent			-3.44			0.49					0.41			-0.54
			3.20			1.79					1.69			1.74

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.


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**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
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Prepared by Dept. of Public Works, Bureau of Engineering, C.I.S. Mapping Division (060001)



*Harpys*

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THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

## 14. Blythe Street

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS --  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES

14. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Blythe Street

Reporting Districts	Total Crimes													
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-Injunction (10 quarters)		Post-Injunction (12 quarters)		
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	154.92	117.00	-37.92 28.18	118.60	135.23	-19.68 17.80	144.95	153.26	-9.97 14.04	157.27	157.27	-1.66 14.41	157.27	2.35 15.52
Adjacent	90.50	83.00	-7.50 3.67	83.80	84.03	-6.47 5.55	85.68	87.94	-4.83 6.29	88.85	88.85	-2.56 6.20	88.85	-1.65 6.81
Neighboring	102.44	90.00	-12.44 10.35	86.88	96.90	-5.54 6.02	102.96	107.54	0.52 7.28	110.84	110.84	5.10 9.08	110.84	8.40 10.14
			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target			-25.47 30.02			-13.25 18.79			-7.25 15.82			-1.00 17.03		-6.05 18.54
Adjacent			4.94 10.98			-0.03 8.19			-2.11 9.62			-1.90 11.00		-10.05 12.21

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.

THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS --  
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES  
FOR EACH INJUNCTION, BY TOTAL CRIMES AND PART 1 CRIMES


14. Total Crimes and Part 1 Crimes: Blythe Street

Reporting Districts	Part 1 Crimes												
	Pre-injunction*	Post Injunction (2 quarters)		Post Injunction (4 quarters)		Post Injunction (6 quarters)		Post Injunction (8 quarters)		Post-injunction (10 quarters)		Post-injunction (12 quarters)	
	Quarterly Mean	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)	Quarterly Mean	Difference (Standard Error)
Target	92.17	65.80	-26.37 18.93	68.90	-23.27 20.00	81.37	-10.80 10.92	89.80	-2.37 10.44	95.62	3.45 11.76	97.80	3.45 12.66
Adjacent	56.60	51.70	-4.90 3.26	51.10	-5.50 3.24	50.83	-5.77 4.42	50.95	-5.65 5.10	51.30	-5.30 5.20	52.23	-4.37 5.74
Neighboring	63.04	54.25	-8.79 6.46	51.28	-11.76 6.30	56.60	-6.44 4.21	60.33	-2.71 5.24	62.38	-0.66 6.80	64.40	1.36 7.55
			Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences		Difference-in-Differences
Target			-17.58		-11.50		-4.36		0.35		4.11		4.27
Adjacent			20.00		20.97		11.71		11.68		13.58		14.74
			3.89		6.26		0.67		-2.94		-4.64		-5.73
			7.24		7.08		6.10		7.31		8.56		9.48

\* Based on 6 Quarters of Pre-injunction period.




**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS --  
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**THE EFFECTS OF CIVIL GANG INJUNCTIONS -  
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Prepared by Dept. of Public Works, Bureau of Engineering, C.I.S., Mapping Division (06/20/21)



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